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Ushkow: Judicial Supervision of Campaign Information: A Proposal to Stop

JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF CAMPAIGN
INFORMATION: A PROPOSAL TO STOP THE
DANGEROUS EROSION OF MADISON'S DESIGN
FOR ACTUAL REPRESENTATION
[N]egative ads will be part of the equation. But we look forward to a
fairfight in which no one is making up their own facts.1
-

I.

Denver Post EditorialBoard

SELECTING OUR LEADERS: A STEADY EROSION OF MADISON'S
DESIGN

On September 4, 2005, less than one week after Hurricane Katrina
devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, and more than three years
into an escalating quagmire in Iraq, Frank Rich facetiously paraphrased
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, writing, "for now ...we have

no choice but to fight the war with the president we have.",2 The failure
in the United States' mode for selecting public officials is the systematic
undermining of informed debate. Election 2004 is defined by a steady
flow of false and misleading advertising. Consequently, citizens are
subjected to national disasters, the likes of which will alter the sociopolitical fabric of the country, before learning facts relevant to issues on
which voting decisions were based years earlier. In the 2006 mid-term
elections, and even more so in the 2008 Presidential campaign, voters
will want to familiarize themselves with the facts, on matters such as
homeland security, foreign policy, alternative energy sources, climate
change/global warming, domestic poverty and the class divide, border
1. Editorial, Political Campaigns of Personal Destruction: Dishonest Attacks on Some
Vietnam Veterans Go from John McCain to Max Cleland to John Kerry. Now Some Slime Has
Oozed into Colorado'sSenate Race, Too, DENV. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at B06 [hereinafter Editorial,
PoliticalCampaigns of PersonalDestruction].
2. Frank Rich, Falluja Floods the Superdome, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 10. Rich was
referencing Rurmsfeld's comment while appearing before a group of Army Reservists in Kuwait.
Responding to an Army specialist's question about insufficient armor, Rumsfeld said, "As you
know, you go to war with the Army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have." See,
e.g., NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Dec. 8, 2004).
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protection, etc. Nevertheless, notwithstanding a sharp course alteration
for federal campaign regulations, information will remain dangerously
watered down by advertisements designed to foster an ignorant
electorate.
Imagine sitting at home on Sunday afternoon in early September,
watching your favorite NFL team. At the first commercial break you are
suddenly assaulted with a bitter political advertisement suggesting
candidate X engaged in questionable behavior. As was the case for many
ads broadcast throughout the 2004 election cycle,3 this issue
advertisement fails to explicitly identify its source. 4 Nevertheless, its
harsh tone is likely to at least influence the opinion of some voters.5
Would you prefer to: (a) take on a homework assignment to determine
whether this ad is accurate; 6 (b) wait months to see how this issue plays
out through the media, if it does in fact play out at all; or (c) be able to
accept the assertions as fact and go back to watching the football game,
or alternatively, be fully aware that the assertion is strictly an opinion
and exactly whose opinion it reflects?
Wishing to select option (c) from the above stated choices is easy.
The greater difficulty, however, is in appreciating why it is increasingly
important to be able to do so. Crafting a legislative solution to this
problem constitutes regulation of electioneering communication-any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication referring to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office, made within sixty days of a
general election or thirty days of a primary that is targeted to the relevant
3. See, e.g., Day to Day: Negative Campaign Ads (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 18, 2004)
[hereinafter Day to Day]. According to reporter Mike Pesca, "the ads bought by interest groups or
so-called 527 committees ... [are] almost all attack ads and it seems a little less truthful than
official campaign commercials." Id; see also Howard Kurtz, Ads Push the Factual Envelope;
Misleading ClaimsHave CandidatesBattling Caricatures,WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2004, at Al.
4. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47
U.S.C.) exempts "527 groups" from the disclosure rules that campaigns and political committees
must follow. A "527 group" is named for the section of the Internal Revenue Code by which it was
created. I.R.C. § 527 (2004). However, not every group actually referred to as a "527 group" in this
post-BCRA era is "actually organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code." The
Whoppers of 2004, FACTCHECK.ORG (Annenberg Political Fact Check, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 31,
2004, http://www.factcheck.org/article298.html.
Disclosure is required if the particular
advertisement constitutes "express advocacy" regardless of whether the group is a registered 527.
See George J. Terwilliger III & John C. Wells, '527' Organizations,NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13, 2004, at
16. However, an ad appearing prior to sixty days outside the election is excluded from these
requirements. See id.
5. See, e.g., Day to Day, supra note 3 (suggesting that voters are mobilized by negative ads).
6. See, e.g., Press Release, Nielsen/NetRatings, Inc., Swift Boat Veterans Controversy and
Political Bashing Drive John Kerry Website Traffic up 113 Percent; Bush Site Jumps 44 Percent,
According to Nielsen/NetRatings (Aug. 26, 2004) (on file with author).
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electorate.7 Necessarily, such a regulation implicates the entire campaign
finance system.
Why does this matter? Because the parallel paths of campaign
finance laws and the relationship between Congress and interest groups
over the last century has rendered meaningless James Madison's design
for a Representative Republic. Madison and his fellow Framers of the
Constitution structured a government premised on actual representation,
secured by the electoral connection between a representative and his
constituency. The Framers consciously rejected the concept of virtual
representation, or representation premised on a community of interests.8
During the revolutionary era, the British Parliament staked its legitimacy
on this theory. For the new American Republic, it would be the electoral
connection that renders an act of the government a legitimate act of the
people. A steady erosion of this connection now plagues the United
States. 9
Madison's design was premised on striking a delicate balance
between liberty to pursue self-interest, but stopping short of the point of
tyranny (i.e., self-interests dominating other groups). 1° The 2004 election
cycle exhibited an onslaught of false or misleading political
advertisements sponsored by independent groups." Allowing false and
misleading ads to flood the airwaves on the interest groups' dollar is at
the very core of the sort of tyranny Madison despised. In theory, the
marketplace of ideas should be able to sort out the facts from the fiction
through ongoing dialogue. However, the media is the gateway of
information and during the 2004 election cycle it failed to satisfy this
role. 12 Consequently, the electorate was overloaded with information of
this false, self-interested variety. The inherent danger is further attrition
of the electoral connection, potentially to the point where the
government's legitimacy is in question.
In this discussion, the campaign finance system is relevant for two
primary reasons. First, the twentieth century saw the rise of the active
legislature as well as the evolution of interest groups. The campaign
finance system's path during this period illustrates how each reform
enhanced the connection between representatives and common interests,
rather than that of the individual voter. This is despite the fact that each

7.
8.

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, tit. 11(a), § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2002).
See infra Part II.

9.

See infra Parts II-IV.

10. See infra Part II.
11. See, e.g., The Whoppers of2004, supra note 4.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
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campaign reform was premised on ending corruption in government and
enhancing the power of the people.
Second, the 2004 election was the first cycle since Congress
overhauled the system in the form of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 200213 (hereinafter "BCRA"). BCRA's sponsors intended to
further "regulate the role that corporations, unions, and wealthy
contributors play in the electoral process" and address "the proliferation
of 'issue ads'."' 4 Although BCRA may have addressed issue ads, it fell
short of the mark. In fact, this Note will explain that Congress not only
missed the mark on issue advocacy, but it set its sights on the wrong dart
board. The target should have been the misleading information that noncandidate advocacy groups peddle in their ads without accountability.
This Note will establish that the campaign reforms of the past
hundred-plus years have jeopardized actual representation, and will
propose an alternative method for reigning in issue advocacy. To this
point, Congress has regulated Federal campaigns by focusing on the
amount of money used for the election or defeat of candidates for public
office.' 5 Upon reviewing BCRA in McConnell v. FEC,Justices Stevens
and O'Connor explained that the Court's standard of review "reflects the
importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits-interests in
preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial
contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral
process through the appearance of corruption.' 6 However, in
steamrolling down this path, Congress failed to consider the quality of17
the expenditures as it relates to advertising and the information
conveyed therein. That is to say the number and cost of broadcast
communications should be irrelevant, so long as the information
contained therein is reasonably rooted in some factual basis.
Moreover, the evolution of the television age of politics has created
a "virtualization" of the public sphere.' 8 Non-candidate groups' ads tend
to not only be exaggerated or misleading, but they also advance a
government rooted in representation of community interests (virtual
representation),' 9 rather than "actual representation" promulgated by an
13.

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).

14.

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003).

15. See infra PartIll.
16. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136 (quotations omitted).
17. See, e.g., NRA Ad Falsely Accuses Kerry, FACTCHECK.ORG (Annenberg Political Fact
Check, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 28, 2004, http://www.factcheck.org/article296.html.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, TH4E CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 47-50 (1989).
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active electorate. 20 The greater the number of misleading ads, the less
likely it is that voters get the actual representation Madison had
envisioned. Enhancing financial disclosure rules and contribution limits,
however, is insufficient to end this erosion. Consequently, the American
people have been dragged down a road where misinformation and false
information flood television and radio airwaves precisely because
legislators generally overlook this disconnect.21
At its core, the proposed legislation to protect our endangered
actual representation would allow the average citizen to choose option
(c) from the scenario above. Preceding the proposed language for this
bill, Part II of this Note examines the very basis for the structure of the
federal government, reaffirming the notion that the American Republic
is premised on actual representation. Thus, staying true to the Framers'
design requires that "We the People" maintain a firm electoral
connection with government, rather than allowing interest groups to
usurp that connection.
Part III provides a chronological exposition of campaign finance
laws beginning at the turn of the twentieth century. The historical
analysis of the group dynamic in America, in conjunction with the
subsequent discussion of modern day campaign finance, evidences
interest groups' consistently growing role. Accordingly, this Part
illustrates how various gaps in campaign finance laws enable the
nation's digression into virtual representation. Also, this Part concludes
with a brief description of BCRA.
Part IV considers BCRA's impact upon the 2004 election cycle,
exactly what went wrong, and the media's perpetuation of the false
information that independent groups disseminated into the marketplace
of ideas. Specifically, first it will establish that there was an onslaught of
false advertisements by independent advocacy groups. Second, this Part
highlights the media's shortcomings during this crucial campaign
season, which circulated the false and misleading misrepresentations
contained in these ads, rather than acting as a channel for public
deliberation.
Part V brings home the notion that legislation in the vein of the
proposed Informed Electorate Act is the only viable solution to false
advertising sponsored by unaccountable independent interest groups.

20. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Historical Perspective: More Apparent Than Real: The
Revolutionary Commitment to ConstitutionalFederalism,45 KAN. L. REV. 993, 1000 (1997).
21. See, e.g., NRA Ad Falsely Accuses Kerry, supra note 17 (illustrating some of the
misinformation that defined the 2004 election).
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MADISON'S DESIGN FOR THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

The United States is a democratic republic or representative
democracy. 22 According to Madison, the unique characteristic of
American politics during the revolutionary era was "actual"
representation 23-"the delegation of the government... to a small
number of citizens elected by the rest., 24 Its significance is that it is
unequivocally distinguishable from the theory of representation in
eighteenth century England known as "virtual" representation. 25 The
American conception of actual representation reflected the Framers'
belief that
"the right of representing is conferred by the act of
26
electing.
The British doctrine of virtual representation, however, extended
beyond British electors to British non-electors 27 and the American
colonists. 28 The prevailing legal argument for the constitutionality 29 of
this theory as it applied to the colonists was interests. Generally, a
"community of interests" existed between Americans and members of
Parliament because of trade. Accordingly, this connection was enough
for British electors and non-electors to have an interest in preventing
oppression in the colonies. 30 Even the likes of Englishman Edmond
Burke, an eighteenth-century writer and member of Parliament with a
reputation for being an aggressive advocate of British subjects around
the globe, said of this theory: "Such a representation I think to be in
many cases even better than the actual ....The people may err in their
choice; but
common interest and common sentiment are rarely
31
mistaken.,
For reasons touched on throughout The Federalist Papers, the
Framers structured a government that implicitly rejected the virtual in
favor of the actual. To this end, James Madison declared in The
FederalistNo. 52:

22. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 595
(1998).
23. See id.
at 597,
24. Id. at 596.
25. See REID, supranote 19, at 50.
26. WOOD, supra note 22, at 597.
27. See REID, supra note 19, at 54. Put simply, a British freeholder could not vote unless the
value of his estate met a threshold statutory requirement. Id.
28. Id. at 48-59.
29. For the sake of clarity, this is constitutionality under the governing documents of Great
Britain.
30. REID, supra note 19, at 47, 51.
31. Id.at 58 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have
a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that
the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent
elections are unquestionably the only policy
32 by which this dependence
and sympathy can be effectually secured.
The modem debate on campaign reform has overtones consistent
with the Framers' struggle to limit tyrannical self-interest without
restricting liberty. Recall that the Framers faced the challenge of
reconciling republicanism (the belief in the public good) with liberty.33
Republicanism, in this classical sense was championed by the likes of
Thomas Paine; he asserted that a republic by definition means public
good.34 Indeed, the American Republic's actual representation rested
upon a hope that "[t]he representatives of the people would not act as
spokesmen for private and partial interests, but all would be disinterested
men, who could have no interest of their own to seek .... To be sure,
if liberated men inherently acted only for the public good, this conflict
would have abated. However, as dominant as the phrase "public good"
was among the Revolutionaries, the phrase "liberty" was invoked more
often.

36

Factions or parties were going to be a consequence of liberty. The
difficulty for the founders was that they set out to devise a structure for a
free state, yet the majority of them despised the notion of party
dominance. "The founders' antipathy toward political parties rested on
their belief that parties were the vehicles by which self-interested groups
and individuals-'factions,' in their terminology-coordinated and
pressed their efforts to seize political power." 37 Madison, a proponent of
the public good, believed self-interest had no place in government. He is
associated, however, with the perception that the evil of parties are
inevitable in a free state and "they must therefore be endured with
patience by all men who esteem liberty." 38 Thus, in Madison's view, the

32.
33.
34.
35.

THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 360 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. 1947).
See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 22, at 55.
Id.
Id.at 59 (citation omitted).

36. Id.at 55.
37. James A. Gardner, Law and Political Parties: Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 667, 668 (2000).
38. Steven G. Calabresi, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction:
PoliticalPartiesas MediatingInstitutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479, 1488 (1994).
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only acceptable cure 39
for the mischief of faction was a structure to
minimize its influence.

Legal scholars such as Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. suggest
"[t]he genius of Madison's thought lay in its reconciliation of our
potentially antipodal desires for both legitimate majoritarian government
and rational public-seeking government .... The latter was abetted by a
constitutional framework assuring deliberative lawmaking and checking
factional domination. 40 Madison's The FederalistNo. 10 is regarded as
the foundation for American political thought.4 1 Accordingly, under the
"good social contract" theory, the desire is for political deliberations that
yield satisfying end-products for all participants in the process.42 While
this theory assumes that the process produces what might be described
as happy customers, a more academic perspective suggests that
Madison's goal and the general goal of the new republic was simply to
protect against domination by a central tyrannical body. Thus, so long as
the legislative body possesses the three legitimizing characteristicsrepresentativeness, accessibility, and deliberativeness-the act of the
legislature is legitimate.43
Regarding representativeness, elections are perhaps the most
defining element.44 As mentioned above, what made the United States
unique was actual representation. This meant that the authority to act on
behalf of "We the People" flowed from the act of voting. All else being
equal, the vote legitimizes government action. After World War II,
however, another player began to impact the legislative process. The
1950s political theory reflected this alteration to the process. In
particular, optimistic pluralism, the prevailing political theory of the
time, accepted what had become interest group domination of
government. 45 This theory's subscribers "were optimistic that the role of
interest groups would not result in mere shifting, temporary majorities.
Groups, it was hoped, would emerge on all sides of each issue and the
protective procedures of lawmaking (bicameralism, the veto, committee

39. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275, 280 (1988).

40. Id.at281.
41. Id.at280.
42. Richard A. Epstein, The Necessity for ConstrainedDeliberation, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 159, 161 (2000).
43. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 369 (2d ed. 2002).

44. See id. at 509.
45. See Eskridge, supra note 39, at 281.
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review) would ensure rational accommodation of interest group
needs. 46
Further, Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks asserted that the
deliberative process-"those steps of the legislative process that slow
legislative decisionmaking and distance it from the passions and
immediacy of the prevailing desires of individual legislators and of
various constituencies" 47 -counters the impact of interest group
lobbying for legislation because process was the true test for a legitimate
legislative product.4 8 The crux of Hart and Sacks' argument was that the
deliberative process manufactures "rational, purposive statutory law. 49
Optimistic pluralism has since been substantially discredited. The rise of
the public choice theory, which exposes at least some of the problems
that interest groups pose for a legitimate republic,50 was at least partially
responsible for this shift in attitude.
Public choice theory is best described as a realistic, transparent
view of how and why legislation is actually enacted. 5' Professor
Eskridge suggests that one of the reasons the public choice theory
debunks optimistic pluralism is that "interest groups skew public
decisionmaking toward private rent-seeking and away from public
interest statutes. 52 Considering the inescapable connection between
lawmakers and those demanding legislation, this indictment is indeed
troubling. Madison envisioned an electoral connection between the
representative government and the voting constituency.53 Interest groups,
however, grew increasingly active in government, just as radio and
eventually television became important campaign mediums. It became
inescapable to notice "that the American system of financing elections
through sometimes secret, often unlimited private donations" armed the
wealthy and the well-organized with an increasing influence
in politics
54
and government "at the expense of the unorganized public."

46. Id.
47. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 677.
48. Eskridge, supra note 39, at 282.
49. See id.
50. See id at 283.
51. See id.at 276. But see Abner J.Mikva, Forwardto Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167, 168-70 (1988) (objecting to the public-choice theory for attempting to
apply a purportedly scientific method to politicians and public officials whose behavior cannot be

accurately attributed to a single motivating factor).
52.
53.
54.
REFORM

Eskridge, supra note 39, at 283.
See THE FEDERALISTNo. 52 (James Madison), supra note 32, at 360.
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL
15 (2d ed. 1980).
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Consequently, although the existence of special interest
contributors led to the perception that government is fraught with
favoritism and corruption, the campaign finance reform movement led to
piecemeal legislation over the course of a century "which, ironically,
may have helped further the very corruption that was the original
target." 55 BCRA is the most recent reform in this trend. This latest
measure, intended to enhance the electoral process, failed to curb noncandidate interest group advertising. Although not necessarily related to
the amount of money spent, it is this paid advertising that has created
"the politics of manipulation" and devaluation of responsibility and
participation.56
According to writer Glenn W. Smith, "the domination of politics by
television advertising amounts to a virtualization of the public
sphere .... Smith's notion of virtual is simply what he calls a "world
of illusion and coercion., 58 The fact is, though, the era of misleading
non-candidate advertising threatens to reduce what was structured as an
actual representative democracy to the type of virtual representation our
founders worked to avoid. Unfortunately, "[t]he problem of the election
reformer in the final third of the 20th century [and early 21st century] is
how to apply democratic principles to elections in an age of media
politics . .

III.

.

59
WHERE ARE WE Now: A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

A.

The Birth of the Group Dynamic

Campaign finance reform's most ardent opponents ridicule such
measures as being too restrictive of speech. The fundamental basis for
this argument is "that contributions and expenditures are at the very core
of political speech ....,,60 Therefore, any restriction of either activity
amounts to a restraint on First Amendment liberty. 61 This position
parallels Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' free marketplace of ideas

55.

Id at14-15.

56. GLENN W. SMITH, THE POLITICS OF DECEIT: SAVING FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY FROM
EXTINCTION 1 (2004).
57. Id.at63.
58. Id.at1.
59. ALEXANDER, supra note 54.
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
61. See id.
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theory. In Holmes's dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,62 he
explained this theory:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
63
Constitution.
Holmes did qualify this statement, however, by suggesting that "we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country. 64
The Supreme Court has taken the latter path in upholding the
majority of campaign finance restrictions. In 2000, for example, the
Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC "upheld the
constitutionality of contribution limits as a tool for remedying real or
perceived corruption of the political process., 65 Nevertheless, despite
free market theorists' criticism, the campaign finance laws of the last
thirty years have been, on the whole, less restrictive than its
predecessors.
In addition to thinking about the chronological history of campaign
finance reform, which follows below, in terms of the free market of
ideas theory, also consider the parallel history of problem solving in the
United States. The first major campaign finance regulations were
enacted close to the start of the twentieth century. 66 Not coincidentally,
this corresponds with a shift from an inactive legislature to an
increasingly active legislative body. This occurred for two reasons. First,
the 1800s was a period of westward expansion, embodied by a public
62.
63.
64.
65.

250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added).
David K. Ryden, To Curb Partiesor to Court Them? Seeking a ConstitutionalFramework

for Campaign Finance Reform, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 171,

171-72 (David L Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002). See generally Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377 (2000).
66. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 26 (discussing that momentum for legislation
increased following the 1904 presidential race and culminated in "[t]he first federal prohibition of
corporate contributions" in 1907).
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perception of growth. 67 By 1900, however, "the factory age, the age of
money, the age of robber barons, of capital and labor at war" recast
to be divided, not a
public opinion to reflect "the economy
68 as a pie
horizon.,
the
beyond
stretching
ladder
Second, although directly related to the first reason, "[i]ndividual
confrontations increasingly gave way to group confrontations, which
needed a different arena for their resolution., 69 While the judicial arena
was for private problem solving and disputes between individuals, the
"open door jurisdiction of the legislative branch" catered to public
dispute resolution or solving conflicts between large groups. 70 The need
for group problem solving increased as did the size and number of
groups hoping to preserve their fair share of the economic pie. Professor
Lawrence M. Friedman provides that "there developed groupings which
centered around economic interests-labor unions, industrial combines,
farmers organizations, occupational associations. These interest groups
jockeyed for position and power in society.'
Additionally, just as this new group dynamic was about to explode,
a wave of electoral reform stifled the dominance of local political
parties.72 Consequently, the influence of local party bosses dwindled and
candidates became more independent. 73 Accompanying this new
independence was a necessity to seek out fresh sources of campaign
funds.74 These reforms, implemented in the 1880s and '90s, gave rise 7to5
what has been described as the "industrialization" of electoral politics.
Candidates could no longer rely on powerful party machines to get them
elected, so candidates hired a professional campaign staff to organize
and disseminate the candidate's message to the public.76
Of course this was not free. In fact, "[d]uring the 1888 presidential
election, the Republican Party leader in Pennsylvania, Matthew Quay,
reached out to steel makers and oil companies worried about tariff
reduction and raised more than three million dollars on behalf of

67. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 338-39 (2d ed. 1985),
reprintedin MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 8-9.

68. Id.
69. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 7.
70. Seeid at 6, 11.
71. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 338-39.
72. See Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and
Campaign FinanceLaw, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 881 (2004).

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
See id at 882.
See id.
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Benjamin Harrison.",7 7 Moreover, that same election marked the entrance

of Mark Hanna to the campaign scene.78 Referred to as the genius and
pioneer of campaign financing, "[i]n 1888 he raised more money than
the Republican National Committee could spend" 79 and returned the
balance to the donors. 80 In 1896, Hanna raised $100,000 to secure
81
William McKinley's presidential nomination by the Republican Party.
Later that year, as chairman of the Republican National Committee, he
spearheaded the groundbreaking campaign responsible for McKinley's
election.82
Hanna's arrival on the campaign landscape also sowed the seeds for
the growing electoral connection between interest groups and elected
officials. The opportunity to contribute was certainly not lost on groups
fighting to secure their slice of the economic pie. On the one hand,
"Hanna tried to make it clear that there were to be no favors for
contributions; McKinley wanted to remain clean. In 1900 Hanna
returned a $10,000 gift to a Wall Street brokerage firm which he
believed was making a specific demand. 8 3 Conversely, Hanna was sure
to capitalize off the economic fears 1896 Democratic Presidential
nominee William Jennings Bryan instilled upon the business
community. 84 Bryan was a populist and his race against McKinley was
telling of the era's escalating group conflicts.85
86
Further, Hanna took contributions from life insurance companies.
These large donations from a number of New York life insurance
companies may have been the catalyst to a public movement to rid
elections of their corporate influence. The scandal itself, known as the
New York life insurance scandal of 1905, was about misuse of
shareholder funds by management executives. 87 However, these
management executives used these funds to support candidates who

77. Id.
78. See id.; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 47 (discussing Mark Hanna as a pioneer
of "the fund-raising techniques of later generations").
79. ALEXANDER, supranote 54, at 47.
80.
81.

See id.
See id.

82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See id (commenting that this campaign "pitted the rich against the poor, the Eastern
establishment against Western farmers."); see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 10 (reflecting
on the notion that organization of interests was instrumental to the protection and advancement of
any individual in need of the limited resources available).
86. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 72, at 884-85.
87. See id.
at 887.
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would legislate for management's benefit at ownership's expense. 88
Incidentally, this brand of corruption was the impetus behind "the
radical transformation in corporate law at the end of the nineteenth
century, which broadened managerial discretion, restricted traditional
rights of owners, and paved the way for the separation of ownership
from control in the modem firm. 8 9
In 1907, Congress reacted to the growing anti-"Big Money"
sentiment, implementing an outright ban on corporate contributions of
money to federal campaigns. 90 This Act rendered it "unlawful for any
national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of
Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election
to any political office." 9' Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Elihu
Root, advocated for the enactment, declaring to the House Committee on
Elections:
It strikes at a constantly growing evil which has done more to shake
the confidence of the plain people of small means of this country in our
political institutions than any other practice which has ever obtained
since the foundation of our Government. And I believe that the time
has come when something ought to be done to put a check to the
giving of $50,000 or $100,000 by a great corporation toward political
purposes uon the understanding that a debt is created from a political
party to it.

Theodore Roosevelt's administration actively pursued this Act's
passage.9 3 Ironically, the public demanded federal action because of a
resurgence of charges following Roosevelt's election in 1904. 94
Corporations allegedly contributed millions of dollars to the Republican
campaign.95 Recall that, as discussed above, the New York life insurance
scandal broke shortly thereafter.

88.
89.

See id.
Id. at 873, 883-92 (discussing the New York life insurance scandal of 1905). It is worth

noting that Winkler's article argues that the ban on corporate money enacted in 1907 was in the
interest of agency costs. See id. at 873. The Supreme Court, however, has treated the agency costs
issue as nothing more than a supporting argument for the 1907 Act. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S.
146, 154 (2003).
90.

91.
92.
omitted).
93.
94.
95.

See The Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).

Id.
United States v. Int'l Union United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957) (citation
Id. at 574-75.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 26.
See id.
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96
In 1910, Congress acted again to further regulate federal elections.
After a similar endeavor to amend the Act failed in 1909, the House and
Senate voted to institute a reporting requirement for specified
contributions and expenditures.97 Additionally, a 1911 amendment
capped congressional candidates' spending during the nomination and
election process, "and forbade them from promising employment for the
purpose of obtaining support." 98 A similar restriction applied to Senate
candidates. 99
When it first meets the eye, this amendment appears to strike at the
heart of what the Buckley Court suggested was directly tied to a
candidate's quantity of free expression, as well as "the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached."' 00 Notwithstanding the ceiling on candidates' personal
expenditures, however, the 1911 amendment happens to be less
restrictive because it not only left alternative avenues for spending (aside
from corporations), but it also carved out an exception for "travel and
subsistence, stationery and postage, writing or printing (other than in
newspapers), and distributing letters, circulars, and posters, and for
telegraph and telephone service" to be excluded from the meaning of
"expenditure."'' l Nevertheless, in under a decade, the regulatory scheme
had already advanced beyond what President Theodore Roosevelt
proclaimed to Congress would be "an effective method of stopping the
evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts."'' 0 2 Evidently these measures
were inadequate.
In 1918, Congress forged forward in the battle against the evils of
"Big Money" politics. Though the 1907 Act was on par with President
Roosevelt's goals, it "was merely the first concrete manifestation of a
continuing congressional concern for elections free from the power of
money."' 0 3 Thus, "in 1918 Congress made it unlawful either to offer or
to solicit anything of value to influence voting."' 4 Shortly thereafter,
05
legislators met a constitutional hurdle in Newberry v. United States.
96. See id.
97. Int'l Union UnitedAuto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 575-76.
98. Id. at 576.
99. Publicity of Political Contributions Act, Pub. L. No. 62-32, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25 (1911).
100. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
101. Ch. 33, 37 Stat. at 28.
102. Int'l Union United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 572 (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905)
(annual address of President Roosevelt)). The "corrupt practices acts" to which Roosevelt referred
are the series of regulations amended by the various Publicity of Political Contributions Acts.
103. Id. at 575 (quotation omitted).
104. Id. at 576 (citation omitted).
105. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
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In Newberry, the Court considered whether a Republican candidate
seeking to represent Michigan in the United States Senate was subject to
the expenditure limits set forth by the Corrupt Practices Act, as amended
in 1911.106 Specifically, the defendant was charged with exceeding the
expenditure limits in securing his party's nomination. 10 7 The unique
issue before the Court was whether the federal government had the
power to regulate party primaries and conventions. Upon considering the
timeline of the enactment of the expenditure limits at issue (1911), the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the popular
election of Senators (1913),108 and a 1914 Act "[p]roviding a temporary
method of conducting the nomination and election of United States
Senators"' 0 9 that expired a year prior to the alleged expenditures, " 0° the
Court determined that elections and primaries are different."' Thus, the
Court invalidated federal regulation of Senate primaries on the ground
that the people have delegated power to Congress via Article I, section 4
and the Seventeenth Amendment to regulate elections, which is defined
' 12
as "final choice of an officer by the duly qualified electors." "
Primaries, on the other hand, are "merely methods by which party
adherents agree upon candidates whom they intend
to offer and support
13
for ultimate choice by all qualified electors.'
Further, the Court opined that primaries were an unknown creature
at the time the Constitution was framed and the more recent Seventeenth
Amendment, did nothing to alter the definition of the word "election."" 4
Unless Congress enacted a statute expressly reaching the nominating
process, as it did with the 1914 Act that had expired, a primary is not
implicated by a statute governing general elections." 5 Consequently, the
Court was sure to remind Congress that as "[e]ach House shall be the
judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members,
and as Congress may by law regulate the times, places and manner of
holding elections, the National Government is not without power to
6
protect itself against corruption, fraud or other malign influences.""

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

See id.at 247.
See id.at 243.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
Act of June 4, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-111, ch. 103, 38 Stat. 384.
Id.
See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921).

112. Id. at 250 (citing Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920)).
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Seeid.
See id.

116. Id. at 258 (quotation omitted).
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Indeed, Congress accepted the Court's advice and, in 1925, undertook "a
comprehensive revision of existing legislation."' 1 7 Incidentally, years
were within the
later the Court "held that primary elections
' 18
Congress."
to
authority
of
grant
Constitution's
Congress's action in 1925, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, was
undoubtedly a more hard-line approach to combating corruption. 1 9 The
tough regulations, including those proscribing jail time for violations,
reflected the attitude the legislature came to embody. Senate Minority
Leader Joseph Taylor Robinson said:
"We all know ...that one of the great political evils of the time is the
apparent hold on political parties which business interests and certain
organizations seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign
contributions. Many believe that when an individual or association of
individuals makes large contributions for the purpose of aiding
candidates of political parties in winning the elections, they expect,
and sometimes demand, and occasionally, at least, receive,
consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which not
infrequently is harmful to the general public interest. It is
unquestionably an evil which120ought to be dealt with, and dealt with
intelligently and effectively."'
The 1925 Act expanded the definition of "contribution" to include the
catch-all phrase "anything of value."'' Additionally, the new legislation
set forth the term "political committee."' 122 This applied to any entity
"which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of
influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates or
presidential and vice presidential electors ..... 123 The financial
and expenditures,
restrictions included disclosure rules for contributions
24
candidates.'
for
limit
expenditure
as well as an
Further, the mere solicitation by a Senator, Representative,
Delegate, or Resident Commissioner or any candidate for those positions
for a contribution for a political purpose was punishable by up to a year
in prison. 125 Any candidate who promised "the appointment, or the use
117. United States v. Int'l Union United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 576 (1957).
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 n.16 (1976) (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941)).
119. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, §§ 301-318, 43 Stat. 1070, 1070-74 (1925).
120.

Int'l Union UnitedAuto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 576-77 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 9507-08.).

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

§ 302, 43 Stat. at 1070-71.
Id.
Id.
See id at §§ 303-09.
Id. at § 312.
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of his influence or support for the appointment of any person to any
public or private position or employment, for the purpose of procuring
support for his candidacy"'' 26 could have been punished with up to two
years in prison.127 Additionally, this penalty extended to any person
promising to make expenditures in return for such a favor. 128 Finally,
section 313 completely barred corporations and national banks from
making any contribution of anything of value. 129 Breach of this section
30
subjected the recipient and the contributor to up to a year ofjail time.
Congress's intent, once more, was adding transparency to the
campaign finance system in order to discourage favoritism and
corruption by elected officials. This powerful motive led the Court in
Burroughs v. United States13 to uphold the regulations in the face of a
constitutional challenge. Petitioners asserted that Article II, section 1 of
the Constitution forecloses Congress from encroaching upon a state's
right to determine the manner of appointment of its presidential
electors.132 To combat this fallacy, Justice Sutherland, writing
for the
33
Court, set forth poignant language from Ex Parte Yarbrough:1
If the government of the United States has within its constitutional
domain no authority to provide against these evils, if the very sources
of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and
outrage, without legal restraint, then, indeed, is the country in danger,
and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which it inspires,
and the love which enshrines it, are at the mercy of the combinations
of those who respect no right but brute34force, on the one hand, and
unprincipled corruptionists on the other.1
Thus, in light of Congress's interest in preventing corruption from
decaying the republic and its constitutional authority to do so, the Court
held it5 is within the legislature's discretion to choose the means to this
13
end.
By the time of the Burroughs decision, the nation was in the thick
of the Great Depression. Although marked by organization conflict, the
early part of the 1900s still reflected the notion of "laissez-faire
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at § 310.
Id.at § 314.
Id. at § 311.
Id. at § 313.

130.

Id.

131. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
132. See id.
at 544.
133.

110 U.S. 651 (1884).

134.
135.

Burroughs,290 U.S. at 547 (quoting Ex ParteYarbrough, 110 U.S. at 667).
See id.
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individualism." 136 The Depression, however, "was an economic plague
so sweeping that it altered expectations about the proper relationship of
law to society, of government to the governed."' 37 In 1933, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt began to implement The New Deal. Roosevelt's
agenda changed the course of American legal history because it "stood
for the proposition that lawmakers should provide a social and economic
'1 38
security net to catch the victims of an impersonal industrial order."
Further, The New Deal has been extremely influential in shaping
the legislature's role and potential products. Not only was the New Deal
geared towards remedying specific economic, social and legal problems
of the 1930s, it also resulted in the development of massive
programmatic legislation. 139 The implication is that Congress could now
engage in public problem solving on a grander level. Interest groups
were able to fight for a larger slice of the pie because Congress might be
dishing out more. Thus, the New Deal marks the beginning of the period
of a truly active legislature.
Chronologically speaking, this is the point at which subscribers to
optimistic pluralism began to formulate their argument as to how interest
groups did not destroy the representative characteristic the legislative
process was intended to personify.1 40 Nevertheless, to subscribers of any
theory, it is quite apparent that Congress's ability to enact programmatic
legislation solidified the electoral connection between interest groups
and elected officials. Richard A. Posner, proponent of the public choice
theory,141 suggests that only organized groups have the ability to
influence legislation because of their membership numbers and financial
support for sympathetic candidates. 142 With the advent of the active
legislature "[s]uch legislation will normally take the form of a statute
transferring wealth from unorganized taxpayers (for example,
consumers) to the interest group." 14 3 Therefore, this turning point for the
federal government's role in general also signifies a crossroads for the
electoral connection between interest groups and legislators.

136. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 267 (1989),
reprintedin MIKVA & LANE, supranote 43, at 9.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 43, at 4 (citing Frank P. Grad, The Ascendancy of
Legislation: Legal Problem Solving in Our Time, 9 DALHOUSIE L.J. 228, 228 (1985)).
140. See supraPart II.
141. SeesupraPartll.
142. See MIKVA & LANE, supranote 43, at 18 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 354-55 (1993)).
143. Id.
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Shortly following Burroughs, Congress considered new reform
measures. Although Congress had effectively limited corporate
contributions, "new methods of raising and spending money soon were
devised.' ' 144 This speaks directly to what the true problem was and had
always been: wealth and its consequences for the democratic process. 145
Senator John H. Bankhead, a Democrat from Alabama, echoed this
sentiment while pushing for the next installment of campaign finance
laws:
We all know that large contributions to political campaigns not only
put the political party under obligation to the large contributors, who
demand pay in the way of legislation, but we also know that large
sums of money are used for the purpose of conducting expensive
campaigns through the newspapers and over the radio; in the
146
publication of all sorts of literature, true and untrue ....
In 1940, Congress reacted to escalating concerns of possible
corruption amongst the federal government's civil administration by
amending the Hatch Act to restrict civil servants' political activity. 4 7
This action also reflected Senator Bankhead's concerns. As a result,
Political Committees, as defined by the 1925 Act, could no longer spend
or receive
in contributions more than $3 million in a single calendar
48
year. 1
Additionally, there was now a restriction on personal wealth. All
persons, including individuals, organizations, or any group of persons,
were prohibited from contributing more than $5000 to a committee or
candidate for federal office, including President and Vice President, in a
single calendar year. 149 There was no limit, however, on the amount a
person may contribute to multiple committees working for the same
purpose or candidate. 50 As interest groups were growing both in number
and influence over legislative output, Congress enacted a law that
actually created an even greater level of demand for a higher number of
organizations. Incidentally, Senator Bankhead's complaint on the Senate
floor referred to expensive campaigns using print and radio advertising

144.

ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 25.

145. See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Union United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577-78
(1957).
146. Id. (citing 86 CONG. REC. 2720). Senator Bankhead expressly took issue with the use of
interest group money for not only true statements, but for the untruthful as well.
147. The Hatch Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767.
148. Id. at 772.
149. Id. at 770.
150. See ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 26.
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disseminating untrue information, yet the legislative solution
contemplated only the price of such campaign activity.
The ink was barely dry on the Hatch Act of 1940 when Congress
addressed campaign finance yet again. World War II placed a high
premium on labor. Consequently, the balance of power shifted towards
trade unions. 151 As the public grew conscious of organized labor's
power, it also grew weary of the immense political contributions with
which unions influenced government. 152 In 1943, Congress protected
defense production from the potential dangers of a labor strike via the
Smith-Connally Act. 153 Also, legislators used this opportunity to extend
the bans on corporate activity, in place since 1907, to organized labor
unions.1 54 The bill's author, Congressman Landis, made a compelling
argument for affording labor unions the same treatment as corporations:
"The public was aroused by many rumors of huge war chests being
maintained by labor unions, of enormous fees and dues being extorted
from war workers, of political contributions to parties and candidates
' 55
which later were held as clubs over the head of high Federal officials."'
The Smith-Connally extension of the corporate ban to labor unions
was merely temporary.1 56 In 1947, however, Congress made the labor
57
contribution ban permanent and imposed even further restriction.'
Thanks, in part, to Congressional investigations into organized labor for
large financial outlays during the 1944 election cycle, 58 Congress
prohibited unions from making election-related expenditures. 5 9
Additionally, this Act explicitly applied to primary elections as well as
general elections. 60 In a constitutional challenge to these measures, the
Court's 1957 decision reflected its highly deferential approach. 161
Accordingly, the Court has since recognized that such deference is
warranted where the undertaking is a "careful legislative adjustment of
the federal electoral laws, in a 'cautious advance, step by step,' to
account for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations
and labor organizations ....
151.

See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Union United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 578 (1957).

152.

See id.

153. See id.
154.

See id.

155. Id.at579.
156. See ALEXANDER, supranote 54, at 27.
157.
158.

See id.
See Int'l Union UnitedAuto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 579-80.

159. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 117 (2003).
160.
161.

See id.
See Int'l Union UnitedAuto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 584-86.

162. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (citations omitted).
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B. FECA
Following World War II, campaign finance reform laid relatively
dormant. President John F. Kennedy, however, was "sensitive to the
advantages wealth gave a candidate."' 63 In fact, even before his
inauguration he established the ground work for the creation of the
Commission on Campaign Costs.' 64 This Commission issued a report
presenting a program for reform, including the first proposal for a
matching funds system. 165 Nevertheless, the recommendations were not
well received by anybody, politician or otherwise. 166 Following
Kennedy's assassination, reform
was ignored by the White House and
67
the debate remained static. 1
Notwithstanding a weak bill passed in 1966, which Congress
subsequently rendered inoperative, the reform movement was dead until
FECA. 168 In 1971, Congress overhauled the entire campaign finance
system, replacing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 with
FECA 169 and the Revenue Act of 1971.170 Actually passed in January of
1972, FECA "reaffirmed that funds from the general treasuries of
corporations and
unions could not be used for political contributions or
' 71
expenditures."'
A major shift in Congress's approach, and perhaps the major
catalyst for problems with non-candidate group spending today, is
FECA's creation of political action committees or PACs. 72 This
authorized corporations and unions to establish a segregated fund and
solicit donations from shareholders, employees, or members for electionrelated contributions and expenditures.' 73 The lone limitation was that
PAC contributions may be accepted only from persons affiliated with the
corporation or union. 174 Additionally, FECA set new disclosure
requirements and contribution caps. For example, candidates and
committees were required to disclose any contribution of $5000 within

163. ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 27.
164. See id
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 28 (discussing the Long Act, enacted in 1966. Due to its waning popularity
among influential Senators, Congress voted to make it inoperative only a year later.).
169. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
170. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
171. Terwilliger & Wells, supra note 4.
172. See id.
173. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003).
174. See Terwilliger & Wells, supra note 4.
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forty-eight hours of receipt. 175 A number of other restrictive provisions,
76
ultimately ruled unconstitutional in Buckley, were also included.1
The 1972 election cycle was the first in which FECA was effective.
This reform was undoubtedly intended to promote transparency in the
financing of campaigns, in order to prevent corruption and favoritism in
government. Instead, it illustrated an undeniable quality of human nature
to find creative ways to accomplish your goal in the face of adversity (a
trait which doomed BCRA's fate as well). Wealthy committees were
able to circumvent FECA's disclosure requirements by siphoning
smaller sums to a vast number of fundraising committees77 working on
behalf of President Richard Nixon's re-election campaign.1
Specifically, the break-in at the Democratic National Committee
Headquarters at Watergate, in June 1972, turned out to have been funded
by Nixon's re-election operation. This prompted a Senate investigation
on presidential campaign activities. The Senate Committee revealed,
among other things, that the donors' motivating force was "furthering
business or private interests by facilitating access to government
officials or
influencing
governmental
decisions ....,,178 One
corporation, American Milk Producers, Inc., provided a particularly
insightful explanation of how and why the new FECA rules were
79
avoided. 1
According to congressional findings, the milk producers received
legal advice to limit committee contributions to $2500 in order to fly
below the radar. 180 Following a meeting with Nixon fundraisers, the
corporation broke down what was initially a $2 million donation into
"numerous smaller contributions to hundreds of committees in various
states which could then hold the money for the President's reelection
campaign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent reporting
requirements without disclosure."' 81 The kicker is that the milk
producers' end game was to gain a meeting with the Nixon
administration regarding price supports.182 Thus, FECA Amendments of
1974 were inevitable; Congress of course felt obliged to take another
83
stab at deterring "unseemly fundraising and campaign practices."',
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See ALEXANDER, supranote 54, at 29.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. (1976).
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 119-20.
Id.at 120.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 118.
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In 1973, the House and Senate each had obstacles to overcome.
Debate on proposed measures was stalled for much of the year. 184 House
members such as Representative Wayne L. Hays of Ohio made passage
difficult because of "the greater frequency with which its members run
for reelection."' 85 Additionally, the embattled Nixon sent his own
proposals to Congress. 1 6 The perception, however, was that Nixon
87
coupled legitimate proposals with those he knew would never pass.
Ultimately, on August 8, 1974, Nixon resigned. On October 15, 1974,
his successor, President Gerald Ford, signed a version of the bill that
passed by large margins in each chamber.' 88 Despite his own
reservations and Nixon's reference to public financing as "taxation
without representation," Ford signed it into law at a' 89White House
ceremony, declaring, "the times demand this legislation."'
The 1974 Amendments "restrict[ed] the use of unlimited numbers
of political committees for fund-raising purposes, limit[ed] individual
and aggregate contributions, impos[ed] spending limits on candidates
and parties"' 90 and established new disclosure requirements for
9
contributions and expenditures above a specified floor amount.' 1
Additionally, the amendments created the Federal Election Commission
("FEC") and set forth parameters for a public financing and matching
funds program. 92 Although the FEC was "created" by this Act and
formally organized in 1975, Buckley
required Congress to reorganize the
193
agency in subsequent legislation.
C. Buckley, Soft Money, andIssue Advertising
Until recently, the 1976 Buckley decision was the authority on what
variety of campaign finance regulations are impermissible.

94

Most of

the 1974 Amendments were upheld. Buckley's construction of those
rules, however, along with the Court's reasoning for invalidating
expenditure restrictions, directly impacted campaign strategy for the
184.
185.
186.
187.

See ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 30-31.
Id.
See id.
See id.

188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Terwilliger & Wells, supra note 4.
191. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.
192. See ALEXANDER, supra note 54, at 31.
193. Seeid. at31-32.
194. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,14-15 (1976) (reviewing the constitutionality
of various portions of FECA).
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next thirty years. Having determined that election reforms, in general,
are within Congress's constitutional authority,' 95 Buckley considered
for political
whether regulating monetary contributions and expenditures
196
purposes was tantamount to regulating political speech.
The Court upheld contribution limits on the ground that
contributions are merely proxy speech; a contribution enables others to
speak on your behalf.' 97 Accordingly, as an incidental restriction on
speech, the Court required the government show only a compelling
interest justifying whatever the impact may in fact be to First
Amendment rights. The potentiality for corruption satisfied this standard
because "Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence" is critical "if confidence in the
system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
98
extent."'

Regarding limits on expenditures "relative to a clearly identified
candidate,"' 199 the Court held that this type of expenditure is speech. As
such, and in light of the fact that actual corruption was accounted for by
limiting contributions, the government failed to justify a limit on
individual expenditures. 200 Thus, under Buckley "[c]andidates,
committees, special interest groups and individuals have the
constitutional right to spend all the money they wish for campaign
advertisements. ' 0 '
Additionally, the Court upheld the disclosure provisions. These
requirements were narrowed, however, from expenditures "relative to a
clearly identified candidate" to "communications that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for

195. See id.at 13.
196. See id.at 14-15.
197. See id at 21; see also Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and
Opportunitiesfor Non-Profit Groups in FederalElections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (2004).

198. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 39.
200. See id.at 46-47.
201. Holman, supra note 197, at 245. The Supreme Court will revisit the issue of candidate
spending limits in Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted,74 U.S.L.W. 3199
(U.S. Sept. 27, 2005) (No. 04-1528). The Second Circuit determined that the interests of avoiding
corruption or the appearance of corruption, and preventing elected officials from focusing so much
attention on fundraising efforts, justifies Vermont's restrictions. See generally Charles Lane, High
Court to Decide Campaign Finance Cases, WASH. POST, Sept. 28. 2005, at A04. Nevertheless,

election law expert, Professor Rick Hasen, is among those predicting that the Court will reverse the
Second Circuit, thus affirming Buckley's holding on expenditure limits. See Breaking News:
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Two Campaign Finance Cases; A New Era in the Court's
Jurisprudence?, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/004069.html (Sept. 27, 2005, 6:21 EST).
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federal office. 20 2 The Court determined the language was impermissibly
vague and the resulting uncertainty would have encouraged silence.
Instead, the Court formulated its infamous "Magic Words" test,
providing a bright line rule distinguishing express advocacy from issue
ads. Consequently, "communications containing express words of
advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast
for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [or]
your ballot
'reject' '' 21 3 were subject to FECA's disclosure requirements and must
have been funded by hard money. Conversely, issue advertising could be
financed with soft money and therefore, aired without disclosure by the
ad's sponsors. 2°
Despite the limited disclosure rules and contribution limits upheld
in Buckley, Congressional reform thrust non-candidate groups further
into the forefront. Just as reforms in the first half of the twentieth century
encouraged a larger number of interest groups to raise money for
political purposes, 205 the permissible use of soft money by non-candidate
groups under FECA as amended in 1974 enhanced the electoral
connection between those interests and the government. True, it was the
Supreme Court that created the "Magic Words" test. However, it was the
FEC that subsequently issued rules allowing political parties to use soft
money for activities intended to influence state or local elections,
"legislative advocacy media advertisements," and part of their mixedpurpose activity (i.e., get out the vote operations and generic party
advertisements).20 6 Therefore, federal law actually permitted
corporations, unions, and individuals "who had already made the
maximum permissible contributions to federal candidates, to contribute"
soft money.20 7
Moreover, Congress encouraged such activity by providing taxexempt status to organizations that are:
[O]rganized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or
making
or
contributions
accepting
indirectly
expenditures ... influencing or attempting to influence the selection,
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal,
State, or local public office or office in a political organization, or the
election of Presidential or Vice Presidential electors, whether or not
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
Id. at 44 n.52.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 127-28 (2003).
See supra Part 1II.A.
See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123.
Id.
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such individual
20 8
appointed.

electors

are

selected, nominated,

elected,

or

This measure was initially adopted in 1975 as part of the post-Watergate
reform movement. The legislative purpose was "to shield contributions
and transfers to political parties from taxation.
...
209 A pre-Buckley
Act, legislators presumed such groups would be subject to FECA's
disclosure rules, which had a broader definition of political activity.2 10
But, as discussed above, the disclosure rules, were limited by Buckley.
Consequently, section 527 evolved into a major loophole allowing nonprofit groups to avoid FECA. The Sierra Club was the first such
organization to register as a "527. ''211
D.

BCRA: What is it and Why Does it Exist?

The next key overhaul of the campaign finance regime did not
come to fruition until 2002. It was following the 1996 Presidential
election, however, that the movement began to build. 12 The impetus for
the next wave of reform was the coordinated activity between federal
candidates and wealthy soft money contributors. According to the
McConnell Court, "[a] former Senator confirmed that candidates and
officials knew who their friends were and sometimes suggested that
corporations or individuals make donations to interest groups that run
issue ads., 213 This came to a head during the 1996 election cycle. A sixvolume report, issued in 1998 by the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, chronicled the favoritism practiced by candidates
of both major parties.214
The Majority and Minority each issued their own report; the
Democratic fundraising practices were investigated by the Majority,
while the Minority investigated the Republican Party.2 15 The findings
were unanimous. Soft money contributions of corporations, unions, and
wealthy individuals in conjunction with issue advertising had led to the
campaign finance system's meltdown.2 16

208. Political Organizations, Pub. L. No. 93-625, 88 Stat. 2108, 2118 (1975) (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 527).
209. Holman, supranote 197, at 266.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122 (2003).
213. Id. at 129 (quotation omitted).
214.

Seeid

215. See id.
216. See id.
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Apparently, "both parties promised and provided special access to
candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for large softmoney contributions., 21 7 For example, international businessman Roger
Tamraz acknowledged contributing $300,000 to the Democratic
National Committee and state parties with the expectation of receiving
"the Federal Government's support for an oil-line project in the
Caucasus. 21 8 Similarly, the Republican National Committee had two
"special access" programs dubbed Team 100 and Republican Eagles.219
One donor in particular was escorted by the RNC chairman to a number
of appointments regarding significant legislation affecting public utility
22 ° Subsequently, the donor became "a hero in his
holding companies.
221
industry."
The Senate Committee concluded change was necessary. One
matter addressed in their report was issue advertising.222 These "ads
were attractive to organizations and candidates precisely because they
were beyond FECA's reach, enabling candidates and their parties to
work closely with friendly interest groups to sponsor so-called issue ads
223
when the candidates themselves were running out of money.
Ultimately, Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Russell Feingold (DWis.) along with Representatives Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and
Marty Meehan (D-Mass.) sponsored "the most sweeping federal
campaign finance legislation since the mid-1970s[,]" in a seven year
effort "to close gaping loopholes in the federal campaign finance
law. 224 Congress enacted BCRA in 2002, attempting to solve what it
called "sham issue advertising" by eliminating soft money and replacing
express advocacy with the term
the Magic Words test for 225
"Electioneering Communication."
The broad language of electioneering communication is significant
because of the enhanced disclosure requirements for issue ads now
within FECA. Such compelled disclosure was upheld by the McConnell
Court because "the important state interests that prompted the Buckley
217.

Id.at 130.

218.

Id.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 130-31.
Seeid. at l31.
Id. at 128.
Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign Finance

Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 235,

237 (2004).
225. See Holman, supra note 197, at 248; see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, tit. 11(a),
§ 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2002).
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Court to uphold FECA's disclosure requirements-providing the
electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any
appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more
' 226
substantive electioneering restrictions-apply in full to BCRA. ,
Moreover, BCRA's challengers asserted that it would prevent speech
from being uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.227 Summarily rejecting
this argument, the Court opined that the challengers "never satisfactorily
answer the question of how 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' speech
can occur when organizations hide themselves from the voting
public., 228 The Court continued that although the challengers claim
BCRA tramples their First Amendment rights, they ignore "the
competing First Amendment interests of individual' 229citizens seeking to
make informed choices in the political marketplace."
Additionally, section 214 of BCRA provides that "expenditures
made by any person (other than a candidate or candidate's authorized
committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the
request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a
political party, shall be considered to be contributions" 230 and subject to
the contribution limits. The implication is that non-candidate groups are
in no way affiliated with candidates, political parties, or the candidate's
designated committee. Nevertheless, despite BCRA's new disclosure
rules, a number of non-profit groups are expressly exempt. Thus, a new
class of stealth organizations emerged during the 2004 election cycle.
These groups were outside FECA's scope and, by their very definition,
were unaccountable for their actions.
IV.

WHAT WENT WRONG: ELECTION
MEDIA

A.

2004, ADVERTISING, AND THE

Gaps in the Complex Regulatory Scheme

The 2004 election cycle provided the first opportunity to consider
BCRA's effectiveness in achieving its sponsors' chief aspiration:
elimination of soft money's impact on politics. 231 Others, however, were
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196.
See id. at 196-97.
Id. at 197.
Id.(emphasis added).
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, tit. 11(b), § 214, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B) (2002).

231. See generally Russell D. Feingold, Policy Essay: Representative Democracy Versus
Corporate Democracy: How Soft Money Erodes the Principle of "One Person, One Vote", 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 378 (1998).
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skeptical of the success such legislation might enjoy in the long run. For
example, Senator Bill Nelson (R-Neb.) said, "[t]he soft money ban in
this bill will likely be more of a temporary road block than a true dead
a detour, and it will flow into federal
end .... [S]oft money will find 232
elections from another direction.,

As Senator Nelson predicted, the 2004 Presidential race became the
vehicle for a categorical illustration of the BCRA environment-an
environment in which independent groups are unaccountable for their
actions or ads. Similar to the way the Hatch Act of 1940 enabled interest
groups (by requiring a greater number of groups to participate in the
process) to ensure that their favored campaigns were sufficiently
effort financed by
funded, 233 BCRA facilitated a massive non-candidate
234
groups.
non-profit
and
wealthy individuals
These independent groups had carte blanche to promote false or
misleading facts because the 2002 Act expressly exempted a category of
expenditures "that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the
request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized
political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its
agents. ' '235 Additionally, BCRA provides that, "expenditures made by
any person (other than a candidate or candidate's authorized committee)
in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political party,
shall be considered to be contributions made to such party
committee .... ,,236 Thus, candidates are theoretically held accountable
by the electorate, while non-candidate groups are by their very nature
operating in a zone in which they answer to no one.
Rather than eliminate soft money, BCRA implicitly shielded a field
of expenditures used to perpetuate misleading information at no political
cost. In fact, Senator Nelson forecasted such an effect. In opposition to
the bill, the Senator proclaimed: "This legislation, once enacted, likely
will hurt the status quo more than it will help. And, ultimately, I predict
it will foster campaign finance regression, rather than institute campaign
finance reform." 237 Further, what was calculated to be an "outing" of
"sham" issue ads actually resulted in a greater number of groups taking
232. 147 CONG. REC. S3240 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Nelson).
233. See supraPart II.A.
234. See, e.g., Mark L. Silow, The Use of Tax-Exempt Entities in Political Campaigns,THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 28, 2004, at 7.
235. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 211, 116 Stat. 81, 92

(2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431).
236. § 214, 116 Stat. at 94 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)).
237.

147 CONG. REc. S3240 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Nelson).
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advantage of the238various tax exempt statuses in the Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.C.").
There are at least four different types of non-profit groups, under
the Internal Revenue Code, that may participate in the campaign process
in some way. The relevant categories are "political organizations"
organized under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code239 , "social
welfare organizations formed pursuant to Section 501[c][4], labor
organizations formed pursuant to Section 501[c][5] and business leagues
formed pursuant to Section 501[c][6]. '2 40
Traditionally, Section 527 groups were known as "Stealth PACs"
because they avoided contribution limits applicable to PACs. 241 Also,
they escaped the disclosure and filing requirements under FECA because
of Buckley's narrow magic words test. Further, disclosure was not
provided for in the Internal Revenue Code.242 In July 2000, this began to
change when advertisements during the presidential primaries were over
the top.243 Particularly troubling was an advertisement by a 527
organization called "Republicans for Clean Air.",244 The organization
avoided all FECA requirements by running the following "issue ad":
Last year, John McCain voted against solar and renewable energy.
That means more use of coal-burning plants that pollute our air. Ohio
Republicans care about clean air. So does Governor Bush. He led one
of the first states in America to clamp down on old coal-burning
electric power plants. Bush's clean air laws will reduce air pollution
more than a quarter million tons a year. That's like taking [five]
off the road. Governor Bush, leading so each day dawns
million cars
245
brighter.
Only later was it revealed that "Republicans for Clean Air" was merely
Charles and Sam Wyly, two brothers who collectively spent $25 million
on ads supporting their favorite candidates.24 6 As it turned out, the pair
of Texas billionaires were "long-time friends and contributors to George

238.
239.

See Silow, supranote 234.
26 U.S.C. § 527 (2005). This section generally governs all political organizations

regardless of whether they qualify as such under FECA. The standard under FECA is a "major
purpose test." Thus, many organizations avail themselves of the Section 527 tax status while
circumventing FECA's filing requirements. See generally Silow, supra note 234.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Silow, supra note 234.
See id.
See Holman, supra note 197, at 266.
See id.

244. See id.
245. Id. at 247 (alteration in original).
246.

See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 128 (2003).
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Bush., 2 4 7 Their identity was known to the public only after they held a
press conference to boast their achievement.248 Congress immediately
implemented modest disclosure requirements for these groups, hoping to
shed some light on the wealthy individuals behind such "issue ads. 249
Additionally, BCRA's amendments and subsequent Internal Revenue
Service ("I.R.S.") revenue rulings created a structure in which 527
groups must, at the very least, file quarterly reports with the I.R.S. °
Consequently 501(c) non-profit groups became the new "Stealth
PACs. 2 51
What does this mean? A greater number of independent ads
contaminated the market of information without being subject to the
same disclosure rules as groups constituting a political committee under
BCRA. According to a study issued by Public Citizen, at least thirteen
groups organized under Section 501(c) were active in the 2004 election
cycle. 252 As of September 2004, two of the largest groups, the AFL-CIO
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, were on pace to spend over $40
million on the presidential race alone. 253 Initially conceived as "lobbying
organizations seeking to influence legislation and public policy in ways
that are compatible with the mission of the organizations,, 254 the
regulatory scheme permits electioneering activity consistent with the
organization's primary purpose. 5 Moreover, until September 2004, the
FEC exempted 501(c) (3) organizations' broadcast advertisements from
regulations implementing BCRA.256
"Precisely how much electioneering activity is permissible" without
spilling over into the Section 527 category of "major purpose to
influence elections" is a grey area. 257 Meanwhile, Section 501(c)
organizations enjoy extremely lax disclosure requirements under the
I.R.C. and operate outside the scope of FECA. 5 8 Moreover, McConnell

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Holman, supra note 197, at 247.
See id at 266.
See id.
See, e.g., Silow, supra note 234.
Holman, supra note 197, at 267.
See Silow, supra note 234.
See id.
Holman, supra note 197, at 267.

255. See id.
256. See Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 124 (D.D.C. 2004), affd, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir.
2005). In Shays, the court entertained a challenge to a number of FEC rules perceived to undermine
BCRA. Among those struck down was the regulation providing that the term electioneering
communication excludes communication paid for by § 501(c)(3) organizations. See id. at 124-28.
257. Holman, supra note 197, at 268.
258. See id. at 280.
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interpreted BCRA's solicitation rules to permit party officials to solicit
funds for and donate money to these groups, so long as they were acting
"in their individual capacities." 259 Thus, the notion that BCRA has
foreclosed the potentiality for corruption because of its restriction on
coordinated activity is without merit. Not only may political parties
their
openly transfer hard money to non-profits, but party officers in
260
individual capacities may solicit soft money contributions as well.
Further blurring the lines between non-candidate interest groups'
expenditures, Section 501(c) groups may form their own PAC under
Section 527.261 This even permits groups to use 501(c) soft money to
finance the administrative costs of operating the Section 527
organizations. Accordingly, there became a number of "family
organizations." MoveOn, for example, is one of the better known
families of organizations. It consists of MoveOn.org, an issue advocacy
group registered as a 501(c) (4) organization, MoveOnPac, a federal
Political Action Committee that helps candidates get elected to office,
and MoveOn.org Voter Fund, a 527 group that educates voters on issues
and the positions of candidates for office.
BCRA, by implicity encouraging fundraising and spending (i.e.,
accountability,
without political
advertising) by organizations
undoubtedly enhanced the electoral connection between government and
interest groups. As a result, the government is one step closer to a virtual
representation-representation based on interests rather than the act of
voting. However, the most obvious mode of defending and protecting
actual representation is persistent voter participation. It seems logical to
assume that if "we the people" go to the polls on election day and vote
for a candidate for public office, the electoral connection is preserved.
the 2004
Unfortunately, the tactics independent groups used throughout
262
campaign circumvent the purpose and importance of voting.
B.

The Problems: Money andFalse Representation

The sums of money non-candidate groups raised during the 2004
election cycle, for the purpose of influencing the outcome, supports the
assertion that BCRA contributed to the American Republic's digression
from actual representation to virtual representation. According to the
Center for Public Integrity, "[i]n 2004 alone, 527s raised a total of $434

259. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 177-78 (2003).
260. See id.
261. See Silow, supranote 234.
262.

See infra Parts IV.B-C.
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million, $60 million more than the amount raised in all of the previous
three years combined. 2 63 More than half of the groups included in that
figure were focused solely on the presidential race. 264 This would be
acceptable but for the overwhelming use of such funds to perpetuate
falsehoods on television and radio, thus threatening voters' ability to
choose the candidate most closely aligned with their values.
The FEC requires 527 groups to disclose expenditures on television
and radio broadcasts mentioning a federal candidate in the final sixty
days of the election cycle.265 Of those disclosed expenditures, 527
groups spent approximately $40 million on advertising supporting or
opposing the Presidential candidates in the final three weeks alone.266
The broadcasting expenditures are particularly troublesome because
non-candidate groups tend to use misleading or false information to
influence the voting public. One advertising executive said, "The really
grotesque aberrations from the truth this year have come from the
'
527S. 267

The problem is not simply that there is a proliferation of false ads.
Rather, it is the complete lack of accountability. Brown University
professor Darrell West told the Washington Post's Howard Kurtz that
independent groups "have run some of the most hard-hitting and
misleading ads, because they are not on the ballot ....The candidates
have to exercise some restraint. The groups have almost no
accountability, so they can say whatever they want." 268 The Colorado
Senate race was one of the tightest of the cycle and an example of
independent groups using false facts to attack the candidates.
In the Colorado race, Democratic Senate candidate Ken Salazar was
attacked by "Americans for Job Security., 269 A 527 organization based
out of Alexandria, Virginia, this group was able to avoid disclosing its
financial backers by focusing on state issues and launching its attack ads
outside the sixty day window during which the piece would be subject to
263.

527s in 2004 Shatter Previous Records for PoliticalFundraising,CENTER FOR PUBLIC

INTEGRITY, Dec. 16, 2004, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?aid=435.
264. See id.
265. See Alex Knott et al., GOP 527s Outspend Dems in Late Ad Blitz: Progessfor America
and Swift Boats Dominated Airwaves in Swing States, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Nov. 3,

2004, available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?aid=42 1.
266. See id.
267. CreativeDifferences; Top Agency Executives Weigh in on the Good, Bad and Ugly of This
Year's PresidentialElection Ads-Most of Which Were Created Off Madison Ave., ADVERTISING
AGE, Nov. 1, 2004, at 64.

268. Howard Kurtz, Ads Aiming Straightfor the Heart; Independent Groups Spend Millions on
Hard-HittingSpots, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2004, at A01.
269. Co: Salazar Calls on Coors to Rebuke Ad, THE FRONTRUNNER, Aug. 25, 2004.
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FECA's regulations.
Mounting the race's first attack ad, the group
asserted that Salazar was at least partially responsible for "the worst
cyanide spill in American history" while running the state's Department
of Natural Resources. 27 1 The Denver Post, however, pointed out that the
Summitville mine, to which the ad refers, actually started polluting in
1986. Salazar first began heading the state agency in late 1990 and had
the mine shut down within one year. 272 The Post went as far as calling
out the group for making up its own facts, editorializing that "negative
ads will be part of the equation. But we look forward to a fair fight in
which no one is making up their own facts.

273

The 2004 Presidential race was every bit as acrimonious as the
contest for Colorado's open Senate seat. However, the stakes were
clearly higher and so was the number of false or misleading ads. Many
of the ads attacking Democratic nominee John Kerry focused on foreign
policy and his opposition of the Vietnam War. One such ad appeared in
Iowa and Wisconsin the weekend of September 25, sponsored by
"Progress for America Voter Fund., 274 This was an independent group
funded by wealthy Republican donors. 275 The ad opened with images of
Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Atta, and other terrorists associated with
the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.2 76 Next were
images of the Towers following the attack, and finally, images of
hooded terrorists. 77 In addition to this "fearsome imagery" the ad
featured "somber background
music" and a narrator speaking in a
"voice-of-doom manner., 278
As the images of Osama bin Laden took the screen, the announcer
said:
These people want to kill us. They kill hundreds of innocent children
in Russia and killed 200 innocent commuters in Spain, and 3,000
innocent Americans. John Kerry has a 30-year record of supporting
cuts in defense and intelligence and endlessly changing positions on

270. Id.
271. Id. (discussing the Denver Post editorial from August 25, 2004).
272.

Id; see also Arthur Kane, Ad Watch Cyanide Salazar, DENV. POST, Aug, 25, 2004, at B-

273.
274.

Editorial, PoliticalCampaignsof PersonalDestruction, supranote 1.
The "Willie Horton" Ad of 2004?, FACTCHECK.ORG (Annenberg Political Fact Check,

04.

Washington, D.C.), Sept. 28, 2004, http://factcheck.org/article268.html.
275.

See id.

276. See id
277. See id.
278.

Id.
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Iraq. Would you trust Kerry against these fanatic
killers? President
27 9
Bush didn't start this war, but he will finish it.
According to Annenberg Political Fact Check, 280 a nonpartisan, not-forprofit voter advocacy organization aiming to minimize the deception in
politics, this fear-mongering ad lacks factual bases for its claims. 281 The
282
ad refers to a thirty-year record supporting cuts in defense spending.
The truth is that Kerry had not opposed a Pentagon budget in more than
eight years and in his twenty years as a Senator (not thirty) he "voted for
Pentagon budgets far more often than he's opposed them ....,283

Further, the reference to a thirty-year record includes Kerry's 1972
failed bid for a seat in Congress during which he famously opposed the
Vietnam War.2 84

Regarding the alleged support for intelligence spending cuts, Kerry
only did so twice. In 1994, he supported a failed bill calling for modest
cuts as part of a deficit-reduction package.2 5 In 1995, he supported a
Republican-sponsored bill calling for one percent cuts in the intelligence
budget in order to account for one billion dollars, which intelligence
officials secretly hoarded, that remained unspent. 286 This measure passed
with bipartisan support.2 87

As for Kerry's position on the war in Iraq, despite attacks to the
contrary, it had been consistent. Prior to the vote authorizing the
President to use force in Iraq, Kerry said on the Senate floor:
Let there be no doubt or confusion about where we stand on this. I will
support a multilateral effort to disarm [Saddam Hussein] by force, if
we ever exhaust those other options, as the President has promised, but
I will not support a unilateral U.S. war against Iraq unless that threat is
imminent and the
multilateral effort has not proven possible under any
288
circumstances.
Consistent with this statement prior to the Iraq vote, Kerry campaigned
on the fact that the President failed to exhaust other options and entered

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id.
A project of the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania.
See The "Willie Horton" Ad of2004?, supra note 274.
Id.
Id.
Id
See id.
See id
See id
148 CONG. REC. S10174 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
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Iraq unilaterally. 289 Further, the evidence relied on by the Bush
administration for its argument that Saddam Hussein posed an imminent
threat was disingenuous at best. 290 Moreover, The San Francisco
Chronicle assessed 200 Kerry speeches on Iraq and determined that
Kerry remained constant despite "clumsy phrases and' 2tortuously
long
91
explanations that made [his] position difficult to follow."
For better or worse, false representation was a bipartisan affair. The
Media Fund, an independent Democratic organization which spent over
$54 million to influence the Presidential contest, 292 sponsored an antiBush radio ad which "state[d] as fact some of the most sensational
falsehoods that Michael Moore merely insinuated in his anti-Bush movie
Fahrenheit 9/11.,,293 The radio spot was released on October 25, less
than two weeks from Election Day and during a period in which votingby-mail and early voting had already begun in some states. 94 Just as the
anti-Kerry groups played up foreign policy issues, this ad focused on the
popular view that the Bush family has close ties with the Saudi royal
family.
In the ad dubbed "Flight Home" the narrator said:
After nearly 3,000 Americans were killed, while our nation was
mourning the dead and the wounded, the Saudi royal family was
making a special request of the Bush White House. As a result, nearly
two dozen of Osama bin Laden's family members were rounded
up... Not to be arrested or detained, but to be taken to an airport,
where a chartered jet was waiting ... to return them to their country.
They could have helped us find Osama bin Laden. Instead the Bush
White House had Osama's family flown home, on a private jet, in the
dead of night, when most other air traffic was grounded. We don't
know whether Osama's family members would have told us where bin
Laden was
hiding. But thanks to the Bush White House... we'll never
295
find out.

289.
290.

See The "Willie Horton "Adof2004?, supra note 274.
See, e.g., CNN Presents: Dead Wrong (CNN television broadcast Aug. 21, 2005)

focusing on the intelligence used to support Secretary of State Colin Powell's case for war in Iraq
before the United Nations).
291. The "Willie Horton" Ad of 2004?, supra note 274 (quotation omitted); see also Marc
Sandalow, Flip-Flopping Charge Unsupported by Facts; Kerry Always Pushed Global
Cooperation, War as Last Resort, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 2004, at Al.
292. Jonathan Riskind, Political Groups Poured Millions into Campaigns, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Ohio), Dec. 17, 2004, at 3A.
293. Media Fund Twists the Truth More Than Michael Moore, FACTCHECK.ORG (Annenberg

Political Fact Check, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 27, 2004, http://www.factcheck.org/article294.html.
294.

See id.

295.

Id. (alteration in original).
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According to Annenberg Fact Check and the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ("9/11 Commission"), almost
every claim here is false.2 96
The piece suggests that the Saudis were flown home while most
other air traffic was grounded. The truth, however, is that this was
September 20, "one week after the FAA allowed commercial air traffic
to resume" 297 on September 13. Perhaps the most powerful accusation is
that bin Laden's family members were not detained for questioning and
the Bush White House is responsible for their ultimate departure. The
9/11 Commission, however, determined that "[t]he FBI interviewed all
persons of interest on these flights prior to their departures .... [N]o one
with known links to terrorism departed on these flights., 298 Moreover,
President Bush was not involved in this decision. In fact, it was Richard
Clarke, "the national security aide who later became one of Bush's
strongest public critics" and he "testified repeatedly that he made the
decision to allow the flights, after consulting with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation .... ,,299
Egregious false statements were a common feature in the 2004
campaigns. Unfortunately, flooding the marketplace of ideas with
blatantly inaccurate information completely eliminates the public's
opportunity to preserve their electoral connection and Madison's design
for actual representation. These non-candidate groups flood the airwaves
with falsehoods, influencing the public to vote for an idea, a false
premise, rather than a candidate. Thus, these independent interest groups
accomplish the task of making the government a representative body
based on interests by inducing the voting public to support their interests
based on false information.
C. The Media in 2004: PerpetuatingFalsehoods
Ideally, the flood of false information into the marketplace of ideas
should be a non-factor in elections. "What do voters do when confronted
with too much information? They turn to trusted or 'objective' sources,
like newspapers and television news." 30 0 This is the last line of defense
296. See id
297. Id.
298. Id. (quoting NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
330 (2003)).
299. Id.
300. David B. Magleby & J. Quin Monson, The Consequencesof NoncandidateSpending, with
a Look to the Future, in THE LAST HURRAH?: SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY IN THE 2002
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 258, 271 (David B. Magleby & J. Quin Monson eds., 2004).
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for the American Republic's actual representation because media outlets
have the means for promoting discussion. During the 2004 election
cycle, however, the media actually added to the problem. Rather than the
24-hour news cycle creating a more informed world, it was merely an
echo chamber of misinformation and false accusations. Moreover, the
media lost almost all credibility and credit for objective reporting with
"Rathergate," the Pundit Payola scandal, and government funded prethat local
packaged fake news stories supporting government 30policies
1
disclosure.
without
aired
country
the
networks across
1. The Echo Chamber of 24-Hour News
Generally, 24-hour news is an echo chamber for the day's top
headlines. By simply repeating sensational headlines and mere
unsupported opinion, false assertions fail to be weeded out through
independent fact-finding by journalists. Instead, news coverage takes the
form of either horse race coverage or he said, she said journalism. On
the one hand you have the traditional short-form reporting where
reporters have abandoned the notion of fact-checking, in favor of
relaying each side of the story regardless of whether the facts warrant
equal treatment.30 2 False balancing of a factually unequal issue is partly
attributable to journalists "afraid of the consequences that verifying facts
could lead3 to" in terms of offending official White House or government
sources.

30

On the other hand you have horse race coverage. The New Yorker
staff writer David Grann explains it as the media adopting "the
operative's worldview, and the way it covers campaigns in many
respects reflects the same ethos that the operatives share; that is: Is this
ad effective? Is this slogan effective? How did the candidate package
himself during the debates? It literally keeps score.,, 304 Exemplifying
horse coverage is "Hardball: The Horserace," MSNBC's re-named
Friday edition of its political show "Hardball" for the final two months
leading up to the election. For example, on September 24, 2004, host
Chris Matthews opened the show with the following:

301. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. S896 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey spoke of these news broadcasts on the Senate floor, stating
that "[t]he Government Accountability Office investigated the legality of these fake news stories
and came back with a clear decision: it was illegal propaganda." Id.
302. See Talk of the Nation: Politics and the Media (National Public Radio broadcast Oct. 20,
2004).
303.
304.

see also Alan Greenblatt, Media Bias, CQ RESEARCHER, Oct. 15, 2004, at 855.
Id.;
Talk of the Nation, supra note 302.
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Welcome to Hardball: "The Horserace," your best guide to the finish
line on November 2. We've asked NBC News reporters, as well as
MSNBC election team people, to join us for this weekly line on the
presidential election, plus key state and local races. Our trifecta
tonight, the top three political stories of the week. From Kelly
O'Donnell, who's covering the Kerry campaign, and Andrea Mitchell
with the inside story
on how the candidates are prepping for their first
305
debate next week.
Rather than examine policy issues, the industry standard is to discuss
technique and methodology.30 6 There is value in this sort of
programming because there are viewers interested in politics in the
academic sense. That value is lost, however, when it is at the total
expense of independent reporting.
This problem is magnified during campaign season, amplifying the
problem with 527 groups' false advertising. Once these ads are
broadcast, the sort of public deliberation that should take place is that
which lies at the heart of the American republic. However, "[t]elevision
networks often replay these attack ads with only periodic attempts at
verifying them." 30 7 Consequently, the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ad
campaign of August 2004 will go down in history as a marker for the
change in presidential campaign strategy. The Swift Boat Veterans was
an anti-Kerry 527 organization focused purely on Kerry's Vietnam War
record. 30 8 That month commenced with Kerry's acceptance speech at the
Democratic National Convention, largely focused on his Vietnam
experience. The convention was framed to make Kerry out as the war
hero candidate. However, shortly after the convention, the Swift Boat
group launched the first of its many television ads.
On August 5, the Swift Boat group aired its ad "Any Questions?" in
seven media markets in just three states.3 °9 It was a full fledged assault
on Kerry's war record. Featured were Swift Boat Veterans such as Louis
Letson declaring, "I know John Kerry is lying about his first Purple
Heart because I treated him for that injury." 3t0 The treatment in question

305. Hardball:ForSeptember 24, 2004 (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 24, 2004).
306. See Talk of the Nation, supra note 302.
307. Howard Kurtz, Ads Push the Factual Envelope; Misleading Claims Have Candidates
Battling Caricatures, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2004, at Al.

308. See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 303, at 856.
309.

See id; see also Republican-funded Group Attacks Kerry's War Record, FACTCHECK.ORG

(Annenberg
Political
Fact
Check,
Washington,
D.C.),
Aug.
6,
http://www.factcheck.org/article231 .html.
310. See Republican-funded Group Attacks Kerry's War Record, supra note 309.
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was on December 3, 1968. 3" The truth is that Kerry's medical records
list J.C. Carreon as the medical officer who treated the injury on that
date, not Letson.31 2 Moreover, Letson himself admits he based his
statement on hearsay.3t 3 In fact, his account varies as to whether the
information he received regarding the wounding was second-hand or
third-hand.3 14
Despite evidence refuting the Swift Boat Veterans' false attacks,
Kerry remained silent on the issue for almost the entire month. 3 5 The
false ad "had an impact on the race because they bought ads in three
states, and cable gave them 24-7 coverage without, at least initially,
scrutinizing what they had to say., 316 Thus, Kerry's campaign's failure
to react damaged his candidacy because of its inability to adapt to the
new reality of the 24-hour news cycle, "which can magnify the impact of
317
the smallest news item."
The publicity surrounding the August Swift Boat ad was indicative
of another aspect of the 2004 election cycle-big publicity bounce from
a modest small market media buy. Nevertheless, in this case too the
media is culpable because "they are so hungry to cover these ads that
318
they're an easy target.,

2. Obstacles to Media Credibility
It is in the public interest to have media outlets provide independent
insight and analysis with respect to catalyzing political ads. Yet, if
journalists covering the Swift Boat story engaged in independent factchecking, who would believe it? According to the Pew Research Center
3 19
for the People & the Press, media credibility is on a steady decline.
Thirty-three percent of those polled by Pew believe all or most of CBS'
"60 Minutes" while thirty-two percent believe all or most of CNN's
news coverage. 320 With far less than fifty percent of the public believing
their coverage, these are actually the highest credibility ratings of all

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Seeid.
Seeid
See id.
Seeid
See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 303, at 856.
CNN Reliable Sources: Media in 2004 (CNN television broadcast Dec. 26, 2004).
Greenblatt, supra note 303, at 856.
Talk ofthe Nation, supra note 302.
See Press Release, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Online News

Audience Larger, More Diverse: News Audiences Increasingly Politicized (June 8, 2004) (on file
with author).
320.

Id.
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broadcast and cable news sources. 321 As for print media, U.S. News and
World Report and the Wall Street Journal are tied for the highest
credibility with a miniscule twenty-four percent of those polled
believing all or most of their coverage.322
Of course this begs the question, "if citizens can't even agree about
what the facts are because they don't trust major sources of
information, 3 23 how can an electorate come to a consensus on facts to
determine for whom to cast their vote? If the press is not credible, the
proliferation of inaccurate non-candidate advertising certainly does not
help. Moreover, since the completion of the Pew survey, there were
three noteworthy scandals that undermine the media's credibility to an
even greater degree: Rathergate, Pundit Payola, and government funded
fake news broadcasts.
Rathergate is the fallout from a "60 Minutes II" feature in early
September 2004 that questioned President Bush's Texas Air National
Guard service. 324 Dan Rather was the correspondent on this story in
which he used sketchy documents to support the relatively well
established claim that President Bush received preferential treatment
during his service.325 Specifically, the memos were supposedly written
by Bush's late commander, Lt. Col. Jerry Killian. In them, Killian
explained that Bush had not taken "a mandatory medical exam and that
[he] felt pressured to sugarcoat an evaluation of Bush. 3 26 Right-leaning
bloggers, or web loggers, were the first to question the memos'
authenticity. 327 Doubters seized on the fact that the documents appeared
to have been drafted using a typewriter that would have been unavailable
to Killian at the time the memos were supposedly written, thirty years
ago. After much reluctance, Rather admitted during the "CBS Evening
News" "that the documents were fake and that CBS had been gulled by a
partisan source.' '328 Although a secretary later confirmed the substance
of the memos, the damage to Rather and CBS' credibility had indeed
321.
322.
323.
324.

See id.
See id.
Greenblatt, supra note 303, at 853.
See, e.g., Nancy Franklin, Rather Knot; This Time, CBS Really Broke the News, THE NEW

YORKER, Oct. 4, 2004, at 108.

325.

See id.

326.

CBS' Rush to Air a Story Produces Fiction, Firestorm, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2005, at

14A.
327. See, e.g., RATHERGATE.COM, http://www.rathergate.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
Rathergate.com is a blog that was launched in light of the speculation that the memos were
forgeries. Additionally, Rathergate.com was among the blogs that spearheaded the call for Rather to
resign.
328. Greenblatt, supra note 303, at 855.
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been done. 329 Furthermore, the collateral damage is an increased level of
distrust for political news, in general, as partisan.
Pundit Payola paints a much gloomier picture for the state of
independent journalism. As of April 2005, the Bush administration
acknowledged paying at least three conservative journalists to "regularly
comment on" Bush's programs and policy decisions.330 In early January
2005, news first broke that Armstrong Williams, a conservative
newspaper columnist for the Detroit Free Press and Washington Times,
and talk-show host, received $240,000 of taxpayers' money to
propagandize on behalf of the Bush administration's No Child Left
Behind ("NCLB") policy through the end of the election cycle.3 3 1
Immediately after the story broke, Williams not only apologized for the
ethics lapse, but admitted he was "among many others. 332
Since Williams suggested that he is only the tip of the iceberg, two
other journalists have been outed: syndicated columnist Michael
McManus and writer Maggie Gallagher.333 These two received $10,000
and $21,500 respectively from the Department of Health and Human
Services.334 Williams's payments were siphoned through the Department
of Education. 335 Subsequently, the new education secretary, Margaret
Spellings, released a list of outstanding contracts the department has
with other media outlets.3 36 Among those listed were337 ABC Radio
Networks, the Bauhaus Media Group, and Radio One Inc.
Regarding Williams's contract with the government, his money
came from the Department of Education, yet "he was not only a
cheerleader for [NCLB] but also for President Bush's Iraq policy and his
performance in the presidential debates. 33 8 Williams's first contract

329. See id.
330. See Frank Rich, All the President's Newsmen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at 2, 32; see
also Anne E. Kornblut, Third Journalist Was Paid To Promote Bush Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2005, at A 17.
331. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-305368, DEP'T OF EDUC.-CONTRACT TO
OBTAIN SERVICES OF ARMSTRONG WILLIAMS 2-4 (Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter GAO, B-305368];
Rich, supra note 330.
332. See Rich, supra note 330.
333. See Kornblut, supra note 330; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-304716,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.-CONTRACT WITH MAGGIE GALLAGHER 5 (Sept. 30, 2005)
[hereinafter GAO, B-304716].
334. See Kornblut, supra note 330.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. Rich, supra note 330.
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with the government was effective December 2003.339 It called for "the
production of two television and two radio ads that would run on
[Williams's radio and television show] 'The Right Side,' featuring the
Secretary of Education and Mr. Williams." 340 Additionally, Williams
was to regularly comment on NCLB and have other Department officials
appear as studio guests.341
That same month, Williams was granted an exclusive interview
with Vice President Dick Cheney, along with the vice president of the
Sinclair Broadcast Group, 342 owner of sixty-two major network affiliates
across the country. 343 "In that chat, Mr. Cheney criticized the press for
its coverage of Halliburton and denounced 'cheap shot journalism' in
which 'the press portray themselves as objective observers of the passing
scene, when they obviously are not objective.' 344 Ironically, the federal
government had just signed up Williams to behave precisely as Cheney
described.
Further, Sinclair made headlines of its own during the election
cycle by first ordering its ABC affiliates to ban an episode of
"Nightline" where anchor Ted Koppel recited the names of the United
States armed serviceman who lost their lives in Iraq,345 and second, by
attempting to air an anti-Kerry documentary called "Stolen Honor" just
days before the election, under the guise of "news. 34 6 Sinclair, however,
ultimately reconsidered airing the documentary because of plummeting
stock prices and threats of a shareholder lawsuit.
On September 30, 2005, the Government Accountability Office
("GAO"), an investigative arm of Congress, reported that the
Department of Education's arrangements with Williams and Ketchum
"violated the fiscal year 2004 publicity or propaganda prohibition." 347 In
a companion decision, the GAO concluded that the government's
contract with Gallagher "does not offend the publicity or propaganda
prohibition., 348 The latter decision, however, reflects the application of a
law aimed at the government's role in contracting for publicity, rather

339. See GAO, B-305368, supra note 331, at 3. For clarification, the Department of Education
contracted with Ketchum, Inc. for Williams's services. See id.
340. Id.
341. See id.
342. See Rich, supra note 330.
343. See Greenblatt, supra note 303, at 868.
344. Rich, supra note 330.
345.

See id.

346. See Greenblatt, supra note 303, at 868, 870; see also Rich, supra note 330.
347. GAO, B-305368, supra note 331, at 14.
348. GAO, B-304716, supra note 333, at 6.
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than a journalist's role in articulating an administration's policies.349
Indeed, the GAO declared that while Gallagher was under contract, she
350
chose to publish articles favoring Bush's Healthy Marriage Initiative.
Thus, whether violative of the law against covert propaganda or not,
both of these "journalists" encroach upon the public's ability to rely
upon the media for trustworthy political and campaign information.
The third prong of the media's declining credibility is the apparent
fake news reports prepackaged by the federal government and broadcast
without disclosure by local networks across the nation. 351 As of March
2005, the GAO released three reports containing findings that the federal
government had produced and distributed "video news releases" for the
last four years. 352 Ranging from topics as controversial as Medicaid
reform and Iraq, to less contentious issues such as an effort to reduce
childhood obesity, these ninety-second pieces were crafted to disguise
their origin. 353 Generally, they featured
former professional reporters
35 4
officials.
administration
with
along
To date, the most infamous series of fake reports are those known
by the reporter's sign-off: "In Washington, I'm Karen Ryan
reporting. 3 55 Ryan, a public relations consultant hired by the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, presented "reports" on Medicare beginning in
January 2004.356 This was shortly before President Bush hit the
campaign trail touting his Medicare policy. The White House press
secretary defended this method of video news releases as "an
informational tool to provide factual information to the American
people. 35 7 The GAO, on the other hand, "found that the segment was
'not strictly factual,' that it contained 'notable omissions'5 358 and it
made its way into approximately twenty-two million households in the
nation's forty largest television markets.359 Worse is the lack of
disclosure; the viewer believes she is watching an unbiased news report.

349. See id at 6-7.
350. See id.
at 7.
351. See David Barstow & Robin Stein, Under Bush, a New Age of PrepackagedNews, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al.
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. Id.
356.

See id.

357. Editorial, Viewer Beware, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2005, at A22.
358. Barstow& Stein, supra note 351.
359. See id.
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In reality, she is being fed a positive story360 with misleading facts,
prepared by the government on her tax dollars.
The GAO held that news reports, which fail to disclose to the
viewing audience that the government is the source of the material, are
illegal covert propaganda. 36 1 The Justice Department, however, issued a
memorandum instructing the federal agencies to ignore the GAO.362
While ignoring the GAO's findings of illegal behavior in the executive
branch, the Bush administration deflected criticism upon the news media
for its complicity in omitting disclosure or reporting of their own. 3 6 3 The
fact of the matter is that television news stations' budgets and staff are
shrinking while their airtime is growing, creating a need for inexpensive
filler.364 Although the number of these pre-packaged reports has doubled
since the government delved into the fake news business, their origin
actually dates back to the first Clinton administration.3 65 Perhaps the
difference now is the way the media handles ethical questions.
Columnist Frank Rich suggests that "[t]he errors of real news
organizations have played perfectly into the administration's insidious
efforts to blur the boundaries between the fake and the real and thereby
demolish the whole notion that there could possibly be an objective and
accurate free press. 366
The erosion of media credibility benefits independent advocacy
groups because the electorate is left without a reliable avenue of
information. The GAO investigations into the various instances of covert
propaganda illustrate the existence of checks and balances against the
conduct of government officials. When it comes to independent
advocacy groups, however, the public's check is supposed to be a free
press. Thus, non-candidate groups broadcast whatever they please with
little worry that a credible news source will conduct an independent
investigation into the facts.

360. See Stop Government Propaganda Act, S. 266, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). The findings
section of the proposed Senate bill, known as the Stop Government Propaganda Act, includes a list
of explicit acts the GAO deemed to be illegal covert propaganda.
361. 151 CONG. REc. S896 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
362. See Barstow & Stein, supra note 351.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. Frank Rich, The While House Stages Its 'DailyShow', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at 1.
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What Would Congress Do?: IntroducedBills and FEC Proposals
Subsequent to the 2004 Election

The 2004 election cycle put on display for the nation BCRA's
shortcomings. While there appears to be a consensus as to the necessity
for congressional action, the same could hardly be said for the specifics
of future legislation. 367 BCRA's sponsors, for example, introduced the
"527 Reform Act of 2004" even before the actual election.3 68 At the start
of the 109th session of Congress, this bill was re-introduced as the "527
Reform Act of 2005. " 369 Proponents of the 527 Reform Act undertook,
in part, to "define political committee and clarify when organizations
described in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 must
register as political committees. .. ,370 Competing bills, however, offer
differing objectives, some of which are likely to polarize the parties.371
Recall that concerns punctuated by the 1996 presidential race were
finally reflected in legislation six years later. Similarly, it is unlikely that
Congress will resolve current divisions in the near future. There are two
primary reasons. First, in Shays v. FEC,37 2 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia invalidated a number of FEC
regulations implementing BCRA.373 Consequently, the FEC commenced

367. For discussion of a number of campaign finance bills already being considered, see Susan
Crabtree, Campaign Finance Goes Retro, CQ WEEKLY, June 10, 2005, at 1590 (discussing House

Republican leaders' effort to roll back portions of BCRA as well as the post-Watergate era law);
Susan Crabtree, New Limits Set for the 527s, CQ WEEKLY, Apr. 29, 2005, at 1150 (providing details

regarding a Senate bill that would require 527 groups to register with the FEC, as well as
Democrats' concerns that Republicans will attempt to repeal changes made in BCRA); Susan
Ferrechio, Fall Agenda: Campaign Finance Changes, CQ WEEKLY, Sept. 5, 2005, at 2319
[hereinafter Ferrechio, Fall Agenda]; Susan Ferrechio, House Promises Fast Action on Campaign
FinanceOverhaul,CQ WEEKLY, July 1, 2005, at 1829.

368. H.R. 5127, 108th Cong. (2004); S.2828, 108th Cong. (2004). On September 22, 2004,
Congressmen Shays and Meehan introduced this bill in the House, where it was referred to the
Committee on House Administration. On the same date, Senator McCain introduced the bill into the

Senate, where it was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
369.

S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005).

370.
371.

H.R. 5127, 108th Cong. (2004).
See, e.g., S. 678, 109th Cong. (2005) (amending FECA 1971 to expressly exclude

communications over the internet from the definition of "public communication"); see also
Crabtree, New Limits Set for the 527s, supra note 367, at 1150 (reflecting Senator Charles E.
Schumer's concern that the Senate bill "is serving as an anti-campaign finance reform Trojan
horse").
372. 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
373. Seeid at 130-31.
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its rulemaking process, seeking 374
comment on proposed regulations in
accordance with the court's order.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the FEC must bring at least
some Internet activity within BCRA's coverage of public
communications. 375 Legislators responded, however, by introducing
376
competing bills in hopes of superceding FEC policy decisions.
Additionally, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid introduced legislation
limited to overruling Shays with respect to its determination that BCRA
fails to exclude the Internet from regulation.3 77 He is also among
legislators who responded to the FEC's notice and comment period by
submitting letters articulating a legislative intent to exclude the Internet
from BCRA.378
It is apparent that the policy implications of any of the Internetrelated bills or regulations being considered are enormous. For example,
election law Professor Richard L. Hasen suggests that should the FEC
subject the Internet to BCRA, then it is likely it will also extend the
media exemption3 79 to online magazines and, to some extent, political
bloggers. 380 Hasen raises the concern that "as everyone gets to own the
equivalent of a printing press, and everyone can become a journalist, the
corporate and labor limit on campaign activity stands to be swallowed

374. See, e.g., Electioneering Communications, 70 Fed. Reg. 49508 (proposed Aug. 24, 2005)
(to be codified at II C.F.R. pt. 100); Internet Communications, 70 Fed. Reg. 16967 (proposed Apr.
4, 2005) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110and 114).
375. See Internet Communications, supra note 374, at 16969-71; see also Joelle Tessler, Web
Pundits May FindIt's Not So Free Speech, CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 8, 2005, at 2172. Initially, the FEC
exempted the Internet from regulation, assuming it was acting consistent with congressional intent.
The Shays court, however, determined that the plain language of BCRA does not expressly exclude
the Intemet. Thus, the FEC must now "consider online activity in its rule-making" and is forced "to
decide whether and how it should regulate such practices as political blogging, e-mail distribution
and online advertising." Id.
376. See, e.g., Stand By Your Internet Ad Act of 2005, H.R. 1580, 109th Cong. (2005)
(proposing to amend FECA 1971 by subjecting audio and video communications transmitted over
the Internet to disclosure requirements); cf 527 Reform Act of 2005 § 5, S. 1053, 109th Cong.
(2005) (introduced into the Senate in lieu of S. 271) (modifying the definition of "public
communication" by expressly excluding communications over the Internet).
377. S. 678, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Tessler, supra note 375.
378. Letter from Harry Reid, U.S. Senate Minority Leader, to Scott Thomas, FEC Chairman
(Mar. 17, 2005) (on file with author).
379. "[B]ona fide news stories and commentaries distributed through a broadcast station,
newspaper, magazine, or 'other periodical publication[s]' are exempt from limits applicable to
other corporate entities. Richard L. Hasen, The Ripple Effects of the FEC's Rules on Political
Blogging: Why They Will End Up Undermining Limits on Corporation and Union Campaign
Finance
Activities,
FINDLAW.COM,
Apr.
5,
2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20050405_hasen.html.
380. See id.
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up by the media exemption.,

38

Thus, in ordering the FEC to regulate the

Internet, Shays inadvertently erected an obstacle to additional reforms.
The second reason for a likely delay in the next round of reform is
that BCRA's opponents are attempting to take a second bite at the apple.
Lawmakers who lost this debate in 2002 are now trying to roll back
BCRA's accomplishments while also imposing restrictions upon 527
groups. 382 Interestingly, one of the bills favored by Republican House

leadership would take the affirmative step of reforming 527
organizations, while repealing older measures upheld by the Supreme
Court because they were intended to combat corruption or the
appearance of corruption. 383 Meanwhile, any legislative efforts with
respect to 527s pose strategic problems for Democrats because while
campaign reform is an element of the party platform, this particular
development "would damage them politically by eliminating what has
been a huge source of campaign money."385384 Thus, the fate of any of
these bills in the Senate remains uncertain.
Congress should abandon the notion of reigning in 527 groups
altogether. The 527 Reform Act, for example, serves the same purpose
as its predecessor (BCRA) 386 and is likely to suffer the same fate:
ineffectiveness. Once again, Congress is seeking to sure up public
confidence in the system by tinkering with the campaign finance rules
rather than taking on the burden of eliminating or suppressing the factors
that contribute to an uninformed electorate and, therefore, towards
virtual representation.
This line of reasoning ignores the past century of campaign finance
reform and recent case law, which offers, "Money, like water, will
always find an outlet."387 Conventional wisdom suggests that 501(c)
groups will simply fill the void left by 527s. 388 Additionally, it is not a
foregone conclusion that Congress could justify regulating 527
organizations under McConnell. In McConnell, the Court determined
381. Id.
382. See, e.g., H.R. 1316, 109th Cong. (2005); Ferrechio, FallAgenda,supra note 367.
383. See H.R.1316; Ferrechio, Fall Agenda: Campaign Finance Changes, supra note 367; see
also cases discussed supra Parts Ill.C-D, IV.A.

384. Ferrechio, Fall Agenda: Campaign Finance Changes, supra note 367.
385. See id.
386. On the floor of the Senate, Senator McCain said, "We are introducing legislation that will
accomplish the same result. We are going to follow every possible avenue to stop 527 groups from
effectively breaking the law, and doing what they are already prohibited from doing by longstanding
laws." 150 CONG. REc. S9526 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain).
387. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
388.

Jonathan Rauch, Here's a New Campaign Finance Reform Plan: Just Stop, NAT'L L.J.,

May 7, 2005, availableat http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/rauch/20050507.htm.
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that corruption or the appearance of corruption justified the regulation of
electioneering communication. For 527s, however, the problem is not
corruption, but deception. 389 Therefore, Congress should tailor
legislation to combat this deception.
In light of the competing policy goals exhibited by legislation
presently before Congress, along with the deterioration of actual
representation caused by the campaign finance measures enacted
throughout the last century, Madison's agenda would be best achieved
by enacting the following proposal.
V.

A.

PROPOSAL: THE INFORMED ELECTORATE ACT

A Summation of the Case for the Informed Electorate Act

Recall the question posed at the start of this Note. Following a
typical political advertisement, two of the options above, (a) and (b),
require a credible and objective media to help inform the public.
Therefore, a legislative solution is required to allow the public to choose
option (c) with confidence. The proposal dubbed here "The Informed
Electorate Act" is intended to provide a level of transparency for the
targeted electorate.
Congress's track record in handling the group dynamic in America
has thrust non-candidate interest groups into such a position that they are
either in the process of, or have already, shattered the quality of "actual
representation" on which the American republic was built. Instead it has
become more like "virtual representation" or representation based on
common interests, which was the foundation for representation in
England expressly rejected by the Framers. This Act would not silence
the common interests; it would allow the electorate to know whether the
advertisement is purely opinion and who is fostering that opinion, or
alternatively, whether they could accept the information as fact.
Moreover, the McConnell Court itself alluded to the public's First
Amendment interest in making informed choices.39 °

389. Cf id (opining that the problem with 527s is influence, and influence is corruption).
390. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197. As discussed above in Part III.D., rejecting BCRA's
opponents' assertion that the legislation tramples their First Amendment rights, the Court expressly
recognized and indeed favored "the competing First Amendment interests of individual citizens
seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace." Id. (emphasis added).
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B.

The Proposal

An Act
To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide a
standard by which independent persons shall be held accountable for
false or misleading advertisements.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
Sec. 1. Short Title
That this Act shall be cited as the "Informed Electorate Act."
Sec. 2. Definitions
All definitions, including "political committee" and "person" are as
provided in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended.
Sec. 3. Applicability of this Act
(a) The provisions of this Act shall apply to any non-candidate
political committee, person, or organization registered under
§ 527[e][1], § 501[c][4],
§ 501[c][5], or § 501[c][6] of the Internal
39 1
Revenue Code.
(b) This Act applies to paid communication broadcast on radio
and/or television that is aired within 360 days of a scheduled primary
election or general election.
Sec. 4. Prohibition of False or Misleading Advertisements
(a) Any advertisement, paid for by a person, committee,
organization, or any group, other than a candidate for federal office,
intended to impact or affect a voter's decision shall not include false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which is likely to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive.
(b) The treasurer of any organization within this Act shall sign a
sworn statement of good faith as to the merit of the message contained
in the advertisement. This sworn affidavit shall be filed within 24
hours of the first time the communication is broadcast. It must be filed
in one of the United State District Court houses in a district in which
the targeted electorate is found. It need only be filed in one of the
districts in which the communication was broadcast during the first 24
hours.
(c) If the treasurer satisfies subsection (b) above and the
advertisement violates subsection (a) above, then such person and the
organization for which he is working shall be subject to penalties as
described below, if and only if he acted in reckless disregard as to the
truth of the content of the advertisement when he signed the statement
of good faith.

391.
IV.A.

These are the not-for-profit organizations excluded from BCRA 2002. See supra Part
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(d) All communication under this section must comply with the
Clarity Standards for Identification of Sponsors of Election-Related
Advertising set forth in § 318 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, as amended by § 311 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (2 U.S.C. § 441d).392
Sec. 5. Disclosure of Opinion Message
(a) Any message that is not intended to be a strict conveyance of
fact and that does not violate section 5(a) of this Act, shall comply
with the Clarity Standards for Identification of Sponsors of ElectionRelated Advertising set forth in § 318 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, as amended by section 311 the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (2 U.S.C. § 441d).
(b) Additionally, an audio statement by the organization's treasurer
or donor of their choice shall identify the organization at the start of
the communication and state: "the following is the opinion of [name of
person, committee or organization]."
Sec. 6. Violations
(a) Every communication broadcast on radio or television which is
sponsored by an entity within section 3 of this Act must be either a
section 4 communication or a section 5 communication.
(b) Any communication broadcast on radio or television that (i)
does not begin with the "opinion disclosure" statement pursuant to
section 5 of this Act, and also (ii) is not accompanied by a filed
affidavit pursuant to section 4 of this Act, is explicitly in violation of
this Act.
(c) Any party whose signature is affixed to the required affidavit
under section 4 of this Act is considered to have committed perjury
and to be in violation of this Act if the communication turns out to be
false, subject to the standard set forth in section 4(c).
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE INFORMED ELECTORATE ACT IS THE PATH
BACK TO ACTUAL REPRESENTATION

Justice Holmes's marketplace of ideas theory posits that you
combat false information with more information. 393 The Informed
Electorate Act does exactly that. Rather than beating the same tired drum
(i.e., the 527 Reform Act), this proposition provides the voter with
knowledge that the ad he or she just viewed or heard was either
reasonably accurate or strictly the opinion of a particular group.

392. This section is intended to provide notice to voters regarding the identity of the noncandidate interest group financing the potentially misleading ad.
393. See supra Part IV.A.
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For example, a group like the Media Fund would be unable to use
television or radio to perpetuate claims that the Bush White House
permitted two dozen Saudis to fly in September 2001 while all major
airlines were grounded, when facts suggest otherwise. While it is well
settled that truthful content of an advertisement cannot constitutionally
be restricted, 394 "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never
been protected for its own sake. 395
Virtual representation and interest group influence is indeed of a
broader scope than discussed in this Note. Yet, certainly the downright
false advertising by non-candidate groups during the 2004 election is a
leap in the wrong direction, to the detriment of voters. The people must
be empowered to firm up their electoral connection for the preservation
of any semblance of Madison's design for actual representation.
Compared to the measures Congress is considering, the Informed
Electorate Act is the lone policy initiative with this legislative purpose.
Michael J. Ushkow*

394. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (holding that the State cannot "completely suppress the dissemination of

concededly truthful information").
395.

Id.at 771.
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